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Preface
"To widen the market and to narrow the competition is always the interest of the
dealers [...] The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from
this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to
be adopted, till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most
scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men,
whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally
an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon
many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it." (Adam Smith, 1776)
This quote shows that economists have been worried about the potentially diverg-
ing interests of rms and society for centuries. While Adam Smith stresses the point
that producers and dealers have a strong interest in gaining market power and limiting
competition, economists nowadays are also well aware that governmental intervention
can sometimes overshoot the mark. As Jean Tirole (1988) puts it: "Imperfectly com-
petitive markets [...] are unlikely to maximize social welfare. This does not necessarily
mean that government intervention can improve on the private outcome given its struc-
ture of information, nor does this observation indicate when and how the government
should intervene."
Since the nineteen-seventies the application of game theoretic models to the analysis
of individual industries and markets has helped to give answers to the problem of
determining the right measure of intervention in private markets. In the constantly
evolving real business world new conicts between policy makers and rms arise that
should be addressed and analyzed by economists.
In this thesis the strategic interplay between government policy and rms is ana-
lyzed using tools from cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Chapter 1 is joint
work with Richard Schmidtke. We consider the problem of governments to set appro-
priate transfer pricing regulations for business relocations by multinational enterprises.
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Chapter 2 is joint work with Hans Zenger. We examine under which circumstances
incumbent rms can predate competitors through exclusive dealing contracts with buy-
ers. In Chapter 3, I propose a model of advertising on internet websites. The websites
have the ability to screen users and address them with targeted information. We ana-
lyze whether a ban of this practice is desirable from a social point of view.
In the remainder of this preface, we briey summarize the main contributions of
the three following chapters of the thesis. All chapters are self-contained and can be
read separately.
In recent years, globalization has caused an increasing volume of international trade
to remain outside the scope of market forces. Today, more than half of global cross-
border trade takes place within multinational enterprises. This a¤ects the prots which
occur in each country and therefore also corporate tax payments. Any kind of cross-
border transaction may allow multinational rms to engage in income shifting from
high-tax to low-tax countries and therefore to benet from di¤erences in local tax rates.
National governments react by installing transfer pricing regulations to avoid an erosion
of their tax base. In Chapter 1, we characterize the optimal choice of transfer pricing
regulations with a special emphasis on the treatment of business relocations. Taking
corporate tax rates as exogenously given, we ask which transfer pricing regulation
countries should agree on in order to maximize their common welfare.
Our study is motivated by two observations: First, although transfer pricing has
emerged as the most important topic for multinational rms to optimize their world-
wide tax burden, so that national governments have enforced strict regulations in re-
sponse, the economic literature does not yet consider any welfare implications of trans-
fer pricing regulations. In particular, the interactions of transfer pricing regulations
with the organizational forms rms choose or the investment decisions rms take has
not been analyzed yet. Second, detailed transfer pricing regulations are by now also
starting to cover business relocations in addition to cross-border transactions of goods,
services and intellectual property rights. The shift in potential future prots through
the relocation of businesses has emerged as one of the most important topics.
We develop a three-stage game that models the relationship between transfer pricing
regulations and welfare. In the rst stage governments cooperatively determine the
transfer pricing regulation. In the second stage rms choose the organizational form,
i.e., whether to relocate a business or not and whether to trade via external markets
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or to carry out trade via internal markets as a multinational rm. In the last stage
prices and prots are realized and taxes are paid by the rms.
In our analysis, we focus on two potential distortions that are attributable to inap-
propriate transfer pricing regulations. First, transfer pricing regulations may inuence
a rms business relocation decision. Thus, inappropriate regulations can either pre-
vent welfare-increasing relocations or encourage relocations that are merely driven by
tax saving incentives, but do not realize production e¢ ciency gains. Second, trans-
fer pricing regulations can have an impact on the type of a business relocation, i.e.,
whether it is carried out between unrelated parties or related parties. As an example,
it is possible that multinational rms have e¢ ciency gains compared to unrelated rms
that are not realized when rms prefer to trade as unrelated rms.
Surprisingly, we nd that a simple transfer pricing regulation dictating that "related
parties have to use the market price of unrelated parties as the intercompany transfer
price as long as no party is worse o¤" implements the rst best solution. The reason
is that the incentives for unrelated parties to relocate business are not distorted by
taxes. Relocation will only occur in cases where to do so is welfare-enhancing and
where unrelated parties split up additional tax savings according to their bargaining
power. Intuitively, unrelated parties will only agree on a relocation if neither party is
worse o¤. This implies that the transferor has to receive a compensation that is at
least as high as the income capitalized if the party does not sell. This threshold value
ensures that only e¢ ciency-increasing relocations are realized.
This result implies that one does not have to account for e¢ ciency di¤erences of a
MNE compared to unrelated parties. Our nding contributes to the ongoing discussion
that is centered around the question of whether and how to take into account e¢ ciency
gains in transfer pricing. E¢ ciency gains of a multinational rm are not reected in
the empirically observable market prices and one would have to adjust the market price
for transfer pricing purposes. We show that they need not be incorporated if one is
concerned about welfare.
In Chapter 2 we turn to practices of predatory pricing and predatory exclusive
dealing. Predatory pricing means that a rm sets prices at a level that implies short
term losses in order to force a rival out of the industry and then get higher prots in
the long-run. Predatory exclusive dealing means that incumbents o¤er buyers exclusive
dealing contracts at terms that also imply the sacrice of short term prots and an
increase in prots in the long-run after a rival has been driven out of the market.
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There are two motivations for our study. First, most recent antitrust procedures
against exclusive dealing have been concerned with predatory exclusion of active rivals.
Strong incumbent companies are accused of accepting lower prots in one period to
exclude an incumbent competitor (in this context called prey) and then recoup those
losses in future periods. Indeed, U.S. antitrust enforcement currently seems to consider
only this type of exclusive dealing as anticompetitive, while typically not intervening
against exclusive dealing which raises short-term prots. Second, predatory exclusive
dealing has so far not been analyzed formally in the economic literature. In this chapter,
we try to ll this gap by investigating the ability of rms to use exclusive dealing in
order to predate.
We develop a two-period price competition model where two (e¢ cient) incumbent
rms compete against each other. One rm is dominant and has a deep pocket, i.e., the
rm has unlimited nancial resources, while the other rm has a small pocket (i.e., it is
dependant on investors). In each period, rms rst simultaneously announce whether
they insist on exclusivity or not. Then both rms set prices and consumers make their
orders. Two scenarios are possible in the second period. Either both rms are still
active in the market and the rst stage game is repeated, or the small rm has left the
market. The latter case can occur when its prots turned out to be so low in the rst
period that it did not obtain continued nancing by its investors. If the small rm has
left the market, the large rm receives monopoly prots in the second period.
By allowing for exclusivity clauses in a model of predation, we show that exclusive
dealing may arise in equilibrium even in circumstances where it can not be protable
in a one period setting. This is an interesting result, because the literature has so
far concentrated on rmspossibilities to increase short term prots through exclusive
dealing agreements. We show that exclusive dealing is often a cheaper way of predating
than predatory pricing. In our model this is the case if the preys access to capital is
not too limited, so ordinary price predation is expensive. It also turns out that the
more market power the predator has with respect to the prey, the more likely it is that
exclusive dealing is preferable for the predator compared to predatory pricing.
These results reect the main advantages and disadvantages of the two instruments.
The big disadvantage of predatory pricing is that it forces the predator to decrease
prices not only for marginal units (those that it intends to capture from the prey to
force the latters prots down), but also for intramarginal units. Predation is a costly
exercise: the predator wants to enhance the reach, but this implies to decrease prices.
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Exclusive dealing is less harmful in that respect. However, exclusive dealing is not
without cost relative to predatory pricing. The big disadvantage of exclusive dealing
is its scope. Exclusivity forces consumers to give up the entire consumer surplus that
they would enjoy from sourcing some units from the prey. This makes it costly to
convince consumers to accept an exclusivity clause.
The previous literature on exclusive dealing has concluded that the exclusion of
existing competitors (as opposed to abstract potential entrants) can only have anti-
competitive e¤ects under particular conditions, for instance, if there are contracting
externalities from related markets. Our model, in contrast, reveals that the scope for
anticompetitive exclusive dealing is much larger. While exclusive dealing may often
not be protable in a static context, it does provide a cheap and e¤ective instrument
to predate in a dynamic setting.
The last chapter of this thesis discusses whether internet websites should be allowed
to analyze user information in order to target advertising. In traditional media like
newspapers and televisions, the content of advertisements is inevitably the same for
all consumers. However, recent technological advances enable internet-based media
to identify users and send them advertisements with di¤erent content. This practice
is called targeted advertising. Targeted advertising on internet websites raises new
and interesting economic questions. When rms are able to learn the identity and
characteristics of users they are able to send individual users selective information on
products. While this could be potentially benecial to users if they get less undesired
advertisements, targeted advertising may also facilitate the practice of price discrimi-
nation.
The issue of market power arises here, because internet websites become information
gatekeepers with regard to the information they have about their users. Websites can
charge higher prices for their advertising space by passing these pieces of information
on to advertisers. One interesting question that is raised here is whether the ability to
identify users increases or lowers the amount of advertisements sent to a user. On the
one hand, advertisers can abstain from sending ads to users who would never buy their
products, but on the other hand they could increase the amount of ads for products
that consumers like. With this study we contribute to the ongoing public debate among
website providers, users and privacy advocates on the desirability of a governmental
ban on such business models.
We develop a three-stage model to analyze the strategic interaction between the
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website, users and advertising rms. Advertising is purely informative in our model,
i.e., people learn about the existence and characteristics of products. In the rst period,
the website provider has to choose between nancing the website with traditional non-
targeted or with targeted advertising. Given the chosen mode, the website then sets
a price per ad. In the second stage, users decide to enter the website or not. In our
model users di¤er in their valuation of the services that the site provides, while they
all have the same aversion towards watching advertisements. Moreover, users di¤er
in their preferences for consumer products. Finally, rms selling consumer products
have to decide on the amount of advertisement they demand and the price that they
promote in their ads.
Our study leads to some new and surprising results. While targeted advertising
always benets rms, consumers are not better o¤ in this mode. Under targeted
advertising, the amount of advertisement can indeed be lower compared to conventional
non-targeted advertising. However, this potentially positive e¤ect for consumers is
overcompensated by the reduction in consumer rent that is caused by rmspractice of
price discrimination. We extend our model to examine the e¤ect of targeted advertising
when rms have to send the same content to all users they address. Interestingly, in
this case consumers can also benet from targeted advertising because they do not
loose rent from buying products compared to the non-targeted advertising mode.
From our analysis we derive some interesting policy implications. On the one hand,
it is undoubtedly positive that targeting lowers the wastage of redundant advertisement
and thus increases e¢ ciency. On the other hand, the ability to target certain user
groups with special rebates decreases consumer utility. To conclude from this that
targeted advertising should per se be prohibited seems to go too far. However, a ban
on price discrimination could make sure that targeted advertising increases the welfare
for all agents involved.
Chapter 1
Transfer Pricing Regulations and
Business Relocations 
1.1 Introduction
Globalization causes an increasing volume of international trade to remain outside the
scope of market forces. UNCTAD (2003), for example, reports that 60% of international
trade takes place within multinational enterprises (hereafter MNEs). Such cross-border
transactions may allow MNEs to engage in income shifting from high-tax to low-tax
jurisdictions and therefore to benet from di¤erences in local tax rates.
National governments react by installing transfer pricing regulations to avoid an
erosion of their tax base. Most industrialized countries base their national legisla-
tion on their interpretation of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD, 2001).1
Presently, tax authorities in over 44 countries have implemented explicit and detailed
regulations. At the same time, they have increased their administrative resources to
monitor compliance. The internationally accepted standard of most countries is the
arms length principle laid out in Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax
Convention (OECD, 2008a).2 This paragraph basically states that related parties have
This chapter is joint work with Richard Schmidtke.
1The OECD transfer pricing guidelines were rst issued in 1979 and have since become interna-
tionally followed. The OECD recommends using the "arms length" principle when treating related
enterprises within a multinational group and a¢ rm traditional transaction methods as the preferred
way of implementing this principle. An extensive update was published in 1995, and revisions and
additional material are published periodically.
2The OECD publishes and continually updates a model tax convention that serves as a template
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to use intercompany transfer prices that would be agreed upon between two unrelated
parties under similar conditions. Therefore, for tax reporting, market prices have to
be applied to intercompany transactions.
In this chapter, we determine the optimal choice of transfer pricing regulations for
two countries in a cooperative setting. Taking corporate tax rates as exogenously given,
we ask on which transfer pricing regulation countries should agree in order to maximize
their common welfare. In this context, we put special emphasis on the treatment of
business relocations. Our work is motivated by two observations:
First, although transfer pricing has emerged as the most important topic for MNEs
to optimize their world-wide tax burden and national governments have enforced strict
regulations, the economic literature does not yet consider any welfare implications of
transfer pricing regulations. In most papers dealing with this topic, transfer pricing is
considered one of the inputs for modeling tax competition between competing jurisdic-
tions. However, to the best of our knowledge, no paper has analyzed the interactions
of transfer pricing regulations with the organizational forms rms choose or the invest-
ment decisions rms take.3
Second, detailed transfer pricing regulations are also now starting to cover business
relocations in addition to cross-border transactions of goods, services and IP. The
transfer of business functions and therefore the shift in potential future prots have
emerged as one of the most important topics. An OECD working group has been
discussing the issue of business relocations since 2005 and has just recently published a
public discussion draft on this issue4. The German government has fuelled the debate
on this issue; as part of its recent corporate tax reform, it articulated an interpretation
of arms length that has been heavily criticized by practitioners, both domestically and
internationally.5
There exists a recent real world example of the importance of business relocations
for bilateral negotiations regarding tax coordination and cooperation. This model is accompanied by a
set of commentaries that reect an OECD-level interpretation of the content of the model convention
provisions.
3One exception is Peralta et. al (2003). In their model, multinationals can choose the production
location, but the applied concept of the transfer pricing rules is very simple. Here, governments can
build up a reputation for monitoring the rules strictly or loosely. Lower enforcement makes a country
more attractive for MNEs, as rms know that they can lower their corporate tax since prot shifting
is possible.
4See OECD (2008b).
5See Kroppen et al. (2007).
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for economies and of the impact of taxes on the incentives for relocation decisions.
Nokia, which seemed to have a protable factory in Bochum (Germany), decided to
relocate its production to Jucu in Romania. Reasons publicly o¤ered were lower labor
costs and the di¤erences in corporate taxes. Romania has a at tax of 16% in contrast
to Germany, where the average corporate tax rate is about 30%. The Nokia example
raises the interesting question of whether this relocation would have happened without
such a di¤erence in local tax rates. If the relocation decision was heavily inuenced
by tax aspects, the relocation might actually decrease global welfare due to additional
shut down costs in Germany and build up costs in Romania.
In order to determine the optimal transfer pricing regulation for business relo-
cations, we develop a simple three-stage game that models the relationship between
welfare and transfer pricing. In the rst stage governments cooperatively settle on the
transfer pricing regulation. In the second stage rms choose the organizational form of
their activities, i.e., how to set up the supply chain and whether to trade via external
markets or to carry out trade via internal markets as a multinational rm. In the last
stage prices and prots are realized and taxes are paid by the rms.
In our model, we focus on two potential distortions that are attributable to inap-
propriate transfer pricing regulations. First, transfer pricing regulations may inuence
a rms business relocation decision. Thus, setting the "wrong" transfer pricing regula-
tions can either prevent relocations that are welfare-increasing or encourage relocations
that are merely driven by tax saving incentives and do not realize production e¢ ciency
gains. Second, transfer pricing regulations can have an impact on the type of a business
relocation, e.g., whether it is carried out between unrelated parties or related parties.
If the transaction takes place between related parties, i.e., in the form of a MNE, the
related parties may have an opportunity to shift income and thus avoid taxes. Hence,
transfer pricing regulations could lead rms to choose an organizational form that
maximizes their after-tax prots but decreases welfare.
Interestingly, we nd that the simple transfer pricing regulation dictating that "re-
lated parties have to use the market price of unrelated parties as the intercompany
transfer price as long as no party is worse o¤" implements the rst best solution. This
is somehow surprising because this simple rule does not account for any e¢ ciency gains
of a MNE compared to unrelated parties. One would expect that in order to give the
rms the right incentives, one would have to condition the optimal regulation on the
e¢ ciency gains realized. However, we nd that the market price of unrelated parties
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already maximizes welfare.
Our nding has interesting implications because there is an ongoing discussion of
whether and how to take into account e¢ ciency gains in transfer pricing. E¢ ciency
gains of a MNE are not reected in the empirically observable market prices and one
would have to adjust the market price for transfer pricing purposes. We show that one
can avoid such cumbersome analyses without negatively impacting welfare. Moreover,
our nding rationalizes the application of the arms length principle from a welfare
point of view.
Furthermore, we nd that, as expected, related and unrelated rms are able to
benet from di¤erences in tax rates. However, counter-intuitively, the incentives for
unrelated parties to relocate business are not distorted by taxes. Relocation will only
occur in cases where to do so is welfare-enhancing and where unrelated parties split
up additional tax savings according to their bargaining power. Intuitively, unrelated
parties will only agree on a relocation if neither party is worse o¤. This implies that
the transferor has to receive a compensation that is at least as high as the income
capitalized if the party does not sell. This threshold value ensures that only e¢ ciency-
increasing relocations are realized.
We then compare our results to the German interpretation of the arms length
principle in the case of business relocations. According to the German government,
loosely speaking, the transfer price should be the average of the after-tax prots realized
at home and abroad if the taxpayer does not show that an alternative price is more
reasonable. The idea behind the average may be that unrelated parties would split
equally the additional prot. However, we show that the German proposal fails to take
into account that the split of prots after tax cannot be used to directly determine
the price paid before taxes. In this chapter we derive the right transfer price given the
assumptions applied by the German government. Furthermore, we point out that the
average may be ad hoc and does not correspond to a welfare-maximizing transfer price.
Related Literature
The literature on transfer pricing can be divided into two elds. One eld focuses on
transfer prices as providers of incentives for managers who have independent decision
power. Examples of this literature are Amershi and Cheng (1990), Holmstrom and
Tirole (1991), and Anctil and Dutta (1999). The second eld examines the implications
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of transfer pricing and tax regulations on intercompany transactions across di¤erent
countries that compete with each other. Examples are Kind et al. (2002, 2005), Hauer
and Schjelderup (2000), Peralta et al. (2003), and Amerighi (2006). While the incentive
literature is applicable to all multidivisional rms, the tax literature applies only to
rms that engage in cross-border transactions across di¤erent tax jurisdictions. Given
that rms are usually allowed to have two sets of books, one for internal bookkeeping
and one for tax accounting requirements, we assume that these problems should be
treated separately. In the following, we therefore refer only to papers from the second
eld.
Since we are concerned with the e¤ect of transfer pricing regulations when MNEs
operate across di¤erent jurisdictions, this chapter belongs to the second group. How-
ever, in contrast to the existing literature, we do not consider a tax competition model
but rather look at governments that coordinate their transfer pricing regulation. We
acknowledge that tax competition takes place but the question regarding the level on
which this competition occurs arises. What we observe is that countries are able to
agree on double tax treaties based on the model tax convention of the OECD. The
basic idea behind these agreements is to avoid double taxation, i.e., prots should be
taxed only once. We assume that it is fair to say that tax competition is more about
tax rates and less about transfer pricing regulations. Di¤erences in transfer pricing
regulations will result in double taxation. Generally double taxation has to be resolved
through costly arbitration procedures as stipulated in the double tax treaties.
Furthermore, we observe that countries were able to coordinate on a common stan-
dard, namely the arms length principle. However, the interpretation of what arms
length means may di¤er from country to country. Our work is intended to provide
guidelines for the application of the arms length principle by analyzing the welfare
maximizing transfer pricing regulations.
There exists some previous literature on optimal transfer pricing regulations starting
with Horst (1977) who analyzes the output decision of a MNE that produces in one
country and sells both domestically and abroad. It is shown that the transfer price that
is selected as the internal price for the transaction to the selling division abroad does
not inuence the quantity decision. The transfer price just cancels out and therefore,
in this setting, does not inuence the allocation6. The intuition behind this result is
6At the end of the appendix, we discuss in a short extension that in our setting the transfer price
does inuence a MNEs quantity decision regarding what percentage of a business to relocate.
Transfer Pricing Rules and Business Relocations 12
that the rm would not be maximizing prots if it did not set marginal revenue equal
to marginal cost in each market under imperfect competition. The transfer price is
then simply an internal transaction that occurs after sales and production have taken
place. Eden (1982) reveals the same result in a more general setting with di¤erent cost
structures.
There are two more recently published papers in which the choice of transfer pricing
rules is also explicitly modeled. Mansori and Weichenrieder (2001) consider two gov-
ernments in jurisdictions with (exogenously xed) di¤erent tax rates. They show that
competition for tax revenue from a MNE leads to the choice of di¤erent transfer prices
and thus double taxation as a non-cooperative equilibrium. The results are excessive
taxation and depressed international trade. In a cooperative setting, both governments
are better o¤ by choosing a common transfer price when side payments are possible.
The reason for this is that the double-marginalization problem is solved and trade and
prots increase. In the absence of side payments, cooperation is not always possible, as
a common transfer price can leave one party worse o¤. Scharf and Raimondos-Moller
(2002) analyze a similar setup with a more general model and arrive at the same re-
sult. In contrast to the literature, we concentrate on deriving optimal transfer price
regulation in a cooperative setting, where governments look for the welfare maximizing
rules.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we set up the model. We solve
for the optimal transfer pricing regulation in section 1.3. In section 1.4, we compare our
ndings to the new German transfer pricing rules. In section 1.5, we discuss alternative
outside options for the transferring and the receiving parties. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Model
We consider a simple model with two countries denoted by i 2 fh; lg : The two countries
have di¤erent tax rates, h 2 [0; 1] and  l 2 [0; 1], which we assume as given. This is
in line with both Mansori and Weichenrieder (2001) and Raimondos-Moller and Scharf
(2002). Country h is the high-tax country, country l is the low-tax country, h >  l.
A rm is considered multinational if it is located in countries h and l. We assume that
taxes have to be paid locally by each entity, hence the e¤ective taxation of related rms
is source-based. This is in line with most of the literature, see e.g. Keen (1993). If a
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rm is solely located in one country, the rm has to pay the local tax rate on its full
prots realized.
We assume that the rm located in country h has developed an improved version of
its old product. Its old product, produced in country h; becomes redundant. The rm
decides on how to set up its supply chain, choosing either to keep the full production in
country h or to relocate part of the production to country l. For simplicity we consider
the production location decision as a zero-one decision for the rm. In the following,
this will be denoted by the variable r. If r = 1, the considered part of the production
is relocated to country l, and if r = 0, the full production remains in country h.
The product can be sold in the world market for a given competitive price p which is
not inuenced by the rms production decisions:We assume that a capacity constraint
allows the rm to sell a xed quantity, which is normalized to one. Hence, the pre-tax
revenue is equal to p. By assuming a capacity constraint, we abstract from any quantity
e¤ects. The reason is that for our analysis, we only need to have the possibility that
rms can face di¤erent prots from producing at home or abroad. The absolute value
of the two prots is not important for our quantitative results.
To keep the model simple, we only consider the part of the production that can
be relocated and normalize the rest, i.e., the part that will always be carried out in
country h, to zero. This is without loss of generality. We assume that for the part
of the production being considered total costs of ci are incurred. ci depends on the
location choice of the rm. We allow ch to be higher, equal to, or lower than cl. Total
costs include variable costs for producing, any xed costs for either converting the old
plant or setting up a new plant as well as transportation costs.
If the rm decides to produce in country l; it has to choose whether to form a
multinational that owns a foreign subsidiary or to remain unrelated and to outsource
production to an unrelated party in country l. We introduce a binary variablem, which
takes the value m = 1 for the rst case and m = 0 for the latter. We assume that a
MNEs transaction costs for producing in country l are di¤erent compared to the case of
two unrelated parties.7 As Williamson discusses, the determinants of transaction costs
are frequency, specicity, uncertainty, limited rationality, and opportunistic behavior.
Hence, to be as general as possible, we assume that the transaction costs incurred
by a MNE can be higher or lower than the transaction costs of unrelated parties.
7For a foundation, see Williamson (1975).
Transfer Pricing Rules and Business Relocations 14
We normalize the transaction costs of two unrelated parties to zero and denote by
di; i = l; h the additional transactions costs incurred by a MNE in country i, where di
can be higher, lower or equal to zero. Thus, we put no restriction on the additional
transaction costs, which means that it can be e¢ cient to set up a MNE (dl + dh < 0)
or it can be harmful to e¢ ciency (dl + dh > 0). Moreover, the e¤ect can be di¤erent
for both subsidiaries in each country (e.g. dl < 0; dh > 0).8
Governments make a decision regarding transfer price regulation. The transfer
pricing regulation demands that the multinational complies with the transfer pricing
rule which we denote by P TP . In our case the transfer price P TP is payable from the
rm in country l to the rm in country h in the case of a production relocation as a
MNE. We assume perfect and complete information regarding the variables p; ci; r;m.
To make the regulation problem interesting we assume that the government cannot
condition P TP on di, since otherwise the optimal regulation would be trivial. We
consider this assumption as realistic because it is quite impossible for an outsider to
perform a reasonable estimate of the di¤erences in e¢ ciency of internal transactions
compared to transactions carried out via the external market. Therefore, in our setting,
the transfer price P TP is a function of p; ci; r;m so:
P TP = P TP (p; ci;; r;m)
If production relocation occurs between unrelated parties, the rms negotiate a market
price PM that is payable from the rm in country l to the rm in country h in order
to compensate for the foregone prot.
We apply the Nash-Bargaining Solution as a micro-foundation of the market price
and make no specic assumption regarding the bargaining power, i.e. we allow for a
range of possible market prices PM .
Given the assumptions mentioned before, rmsprot functions can be stated as
follows:
h = (1  h)

(1  r)(p  ch) + r(m(P TP   dh) + (1 m)PM)

8Note that we consider net present values. So transaction costs refer not only to the actual
relocation of the business, but also to the future relationship between the two rms. It could be the
case, for example, that the product is a good that the enterprise in country h requires as an input
for future production. Given the nature of the particular product it can be better or worse for the
future receiver of the input to be integrated with the supplier or not. Consequently, our di can be
interpreted both as a factor in a one-time transaction or in a long-term relationship.
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which is the net (after-tax) prot in country h and
l = (1   l)

r((p  cl) +m( P TP   dl)  (1 m)PM)

which is the net (after-tax) prot in country l.
The governments objective is to maximize global welfare. Given that the nal
product market is perfectly competitive, consumer surplus is not a¤ected by any deci-
sion in our model and we can restrict attention to the production side. This is in line
with the setup of Raimondos-Moller and Scharf (2002).
One might ask what would happen if we allowed consumers to benet from the
relocation decision of a MNE. If the nal product market were not perfectly compet-
itive, lower production costs would also lead to a lower price for the nal good. The
impact on the consumer price would depend on the particular features of the nal
good market, e.g., the demand elasticity and the number of rms serving this market.
There would be a direct relation between the higher prots rms get from a business
relocation and the benets consumers get through lower prices. This means that if
rms realized an e¢ ciency gain, consumers would also benet. If no e¢ ciencies were
realized, consumers would not enjoy a higher surplus, too. Since the absolute values
of these welfare gains are not relevant for our quantitative results, we think it is an
appropriate simplication to focus only on producer surplus.
Global welfare in our model is dened as the sum of the rmsprots plus taxes
paid. This equals the sum of the rmspre-tax prots:
W = (1  r)(p  ch) + r(p  cl)  rm (dl + dh)
Obviously, the transfer pricing regulation P TP does not directly inuence the welfare
function, as P TP does not appear in the function above. Shifting income from country
l to country h via P TP is left pocket/ right pocket and yields no direct welfare e¤ect.
However, as we will show in the following, P TP changes the rmsprot-maximizing
behavior and therefore has an indirect impact on welfare.
We assume that the timing of the game is as follows: rst, governments implement
a transfer price regulation P TP . Second, rms observe P TP and decide whether to
relocate production and if they relocate production, whether to relocate within a MNE
Transfer Pricing Rules and Business Relocations 16
or between unrelated parties. In the last stage, prices and prots are realized, and
taxes are paid.
1.3 Equilibrium
We solve the model by backward induction and rst look at the last stage where three
di¤erent outcomes are possible.
1.3.1 Third Stage
If the rm has decided to transfer business within a MNE (r = 1;m = 1), then a cross-
border transaction by a multinational enterprise occurs. The transfer price applied has
to comply with the regulation P TP set by the government. In this case the following
prots are realized:
h = (1  h)
 
P TP   dh

in country h, and
l = (1   l)

p  (cl + dl)  P TP

in country l.
The rm located in h can also transfer the business to an unrelated receiving party
(m = 0; r = 1). In this case, the compensation payment PM is determined through
negotiations between both rms. The following prots are realized:
h = (1  h)PM
in country h, and
l = (1   l)

p  cl   PM

in country l.
Third, no production relocation occurs (m = 0; r = 0), and the following prots
are realized:
h = (1  h)(p  ch)
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in country h, and
l = 0
in country l.
1.3.2 Second Stage
In the second stage, the decision is made, given P TP , whether to relocate the produc-
tion, and if yes, whether or not to relocate as a MNE. We rst analyze the relocation
decision given the rms stay unrelated. The rm located in h has to decide whether
to relocate its business to the rm located in l in return for a compensation payment
PM , determined through Nash-bargaining, or to realize the associated prots of the
business at home.
Usually, applying the Nash bargaining solution can be performed in two steps. In
the rst step, rms choose the alternative that maximizes the sum of prots, and in
the second stage, they split the prots according to the Nash bargaining solution. In
classical Nash bargaining games, the optimum chosen always has to be the alternative
that maximizes the sum of prots. Otherwise, it is possible to realize a Pareto im-
provement by choosing an alternative that increases the sum of prots. The additional
prot can be distributed in a way in which no party is worse o¤, since side payments do
not change the sum of prots. Therefore, maximizing the sum of prots and splitting
the sum are separable problems.
Quite contrary to the classical Nash bargaining game, the relocation decision is
non-separable from the compensation decision in our model considered. This is due
to the fact that the compensation price PM has an impact on the sum of prots after
taxes. Firms care about prots after taxes but PM is paid before taxes. Therefore, if
the local taxes rates are di¤erent, as assumed, then PM determines the sum of after-tax
prots. Thus, the relocation decision and compensation payment are interdependent
problems. Interestingly, this destroys the possibility of unrelated parties proting from
any di¤erential in local tax rates, ceteris paribus. A tax saving e¤ect appears only for
the additional pretax prots realized through the business relocation.
Proposition 1.1 Unrelated parties relocate the production if and only if cl < ch. If
cl < ch; they agree on a transfer price PM as a compensation for the business relocation
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according to the following formula:
PM =
 (1   l) (p  cl) + (1  ) (1  h) (p  ch)
1  (1  ) h    l
where  2 [0; 1] denotes the bargaining power between both parties.9
We see that, due to the necessary condition cl < ch, unrelated rms will only
relocate their business if it is welfare-enhancing. Intuitively, in the case of unrelated
parties, each party is maximizing its own prot and not the sum of both prots. The
rm in country h will only relocate its business if it receives a compensation payment
that is at least as high as the prot it gains from performing the production on its
own. This sets a lower limit on the price PM : The rm in country l can only a¤ord
such a compensating payment if it realizes a prot from the production that is higher
than what the rm in country h would have realized. This means that rm l has to
be more e¢ cient. Therefore, trading between the two unrelated parties ensures that
only e¢ cient relocation decisions are performed. Interestingly, this implies that the
relocation decision of unrelated parties is not distorted by any di¤erences in corporate
tax rates. Even if the tax rate of the receiving rm were zero, the delivering party
would still have to pay taxes on PM , which acts as a device to ensure that only
welfare-increasing relocations are performed.
Next, we consider when it does pay o¤ for rm h to relocate as a MNE which has
two consequences: First, the transfer pricing regulation P TP has to be applied and
second, the di¤erence of the transactions costs di have to be considered. The following
proposition summarizes the decisions taken by the rms.
Proposition 1.2 Assume that producing in country l is more e¢ cient than in country
h, ch > cl, then production is relocated and if
P TP <
(1   l)dl + (1  h)dh
( l   h) + P
M
the rms choose a MNE as the organizational form. If
P TP >
(1   l)dl + (1  h)dh
( l   h) + P
M
9All proofs of this chapter are contained in the appendix.
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the rms chose to relocate as unrelated parties. If
P TP =
(1   l)dl + (1  h)dh
( l   h) + P
M
rms are indi¤erent.
Assume that producing in country l is less e¢ cient than in country ch < cl, then if
P TP <
(1  h)(p  ch + dh)  (1   l)(p  cl   dl)
( l   h)
the rms choose a MNE as organizational form and relocate. If
P TP >
(1  h)(p  ch + dh)  (1   l)(p  cl   dl)
( l   h)
the rms stay unrelated and no relocation takes place. If
P TP =
(1  h)(p  ch + dh)  (1   l)(p  cl   dl)
( l   h)
they are indi¤erent between choosing a MNE as organizational form/ relocation and
staying unrelated/ no relocation.
We nd that if ch > cl, then relocation will occur for sure. If this relocation is not
conducted through a MNE, then unrelated parties will agree upon a relocation, since
both parties benet from the enhanced e¢ ciency. The decision to relocate as a MNE
depends on the magnitude between the tax e¤ect and the impact on the transactions
costs weighted by the applicable tax rates. If ch < cl, then unrelated parties will not
relocate the production, independent of any tax di¤erences. However, it might pay o¤
to relocate as a MNE if the tax savings are high enough compared to the transaction
costs and the di¤erence between ch and cl.
1.3.3 First Stage
Governments choose P TP = P TP (p; ci;r;m) to maximize the following welfare function
W = (1  r)(p  ch) + r(p  cl)  rm (dl + dh)
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We nd that there exists a simple transfer pricing rule which guarantees that neither
of the potential distortions occurs despite the fact that governments cannot condition
on di.
Proposition 1.3 When governments cannot condition on di, there is a unique transfer
pricing rule that implements rst best in our setting:
P TP = maxfp  ch;PMg
Intuitively, the optimal transfer pricing regulation has to ensure that:
(1) a MNE relocates if and only if it is welfare-enhancing (ch > cl+dl+dh). This is
implemented by the rst part of the condition, namely that P TP has to be at minimum
p   ch. The condition ensures that prots realized in country h are as high as those
realized without a relocation. As in the case of unrelated parties, then only welfare
enhancing relocations are carried out.
(2) the relocation is carried out as MNE if and only if it is welfare enhancing
compared to a relocation between unrelated parties(dl + dh < 0). This is implemented
by the second part of the condition namely, PM . It ensures that if dl + dh < 0, then
P TP is not too high and that if dl + dh > 0, then P TP is not too low so that the right
incentives for creating a MNE are given to the rms.
Interestingly, the proposition shows that the simple rule to "use the market price
of unrelated parties as the transfer price between related parties as long as no party is
worse o¤" implements the rst best solution. Hence, no accounting for any e¢ ciency
gains has to be performed in order to maximize welfare.
This insight has quite interesting implications for the practical work in transfer
pricing. In practice, tax authorities may ask for accounting of e¢ ciency gains, using the
argument that unrelated rms would also take into account e¢ ciency gains. Basically,
this comes down to the question of whether the arms length principle suggests that
related parties have to use the same prices as do unrelated parties or whether it is saying
that related parties have to use the price that the latter agree upon, as would occur in
a relationship between such parties (thereby explicitly taking into account transaction
Transfer Pricing Rules and Business Relocations 21
cost di¤erences). In the latter case the di¤erence is that each party maximizes its
pay-o¤ given the sum of payo¤s generated from the relationship.
However, this would mean that one cannot use prices observed empirically, as such
prices are between unrelated parties and the price used by related parties may di¤er.
Consequently, if aspects related to e¢ ciency are involved, one would always have to do
a kind of hypothetical arms length test to account for di¤erences in e¢ ciency, and no
empirical verication would be possible. We conclude that to avoid hypothetical arms
length tests has its merits, since the test always leaves room for tedious discussions
rather than furnishing veriable facts as empirical methods do.
As we have shown, it is possible to use empirically observable prices without sacri-
cing e¢ ciency. Furthermore, the rst term in brackets of proposition 3 tells us what
to do if it is not possible to determine an empirically observable price, since a relocation
leads to e¢ ciency gains only for related parties. In this case one can prevent distorting
relocations by setting the transfer price equal to the transferring partys expected prot
in the absence of a relocation.
1.4 Discussion of the German Transfer Pricing
Regulations
In the following section, we discuss the new German transfer pricing regulations, Sec.
1 Foreign Tax Code, in the light of the ndings above.
The German transfer pricing regulations set a hierarchy of transfer pricing rules:
the transfer price has to be determined primarily by the comparable uncontrolled price
method, the resale price method or the cost-plus method, i.e., by empirical methods.
The aim is to derive a transfer price that would have been agreed upon between unre-
lated parties under similar circumstances. If comparable or limited comparable arms
length values cannot be determined empirically, the taxpayer has to perform a hypo-
thetical arms length test. In this case, the taxpayer has to determine the minimum
price of the supplier and the maximum price of the recipient (range of potential agree-
ment). The prices have to be based on the internal nancing planning data of both
sides. The minimum and maximum price will be determined using the expected after-
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tax prot. Then the price in the range with the utmost probability shall be used; if no
other price is substantiated, the average shall be used.
Applying the empirical methods yields a transfer price that equals the market price
between unrelated parties, P TP = PM . As shown above, this gives rms the right
incentives to relocate business while ensuring that the transaction is only performed
within a MNE if it is welfare enhancing, so dl + dh < 0: We therefore conclude that in
this sense the new German law has no negative impact on welfare.
However, we nd that the hypothetical arms length test as outlined by the German
government can lead to distortions. In particular, as described in the decree law of the
German government, the tax payer has to follow a certain model of how to derive the
intercompany transfer price. In the respective decree law, it is described in detail that
the transfer price should be the average of the suppliers and the recipients after-tax
prots. Translated into our model this would yield the following transfer price:10
P TP =
(1   l) (p  cl   dl) + (1  h) (p  ch   dh)
2
:
Obviously, this price is ad hoc because it is not clear why unrelated parties should
agree on a price such as the market price. First, the actual outcome depends on the
partiesbargaining power and outside options where the German government simply
assumes that taking an average should be generally applied. Only in cases where the
taxpayer can show that a di¤erent outcome is more reasonable, the taxpayer is allowed
to deviate from the average rule. However, it is not clear on what basis the taxpayer
should carry out such a proof.
Second, even if the bargaining power were equal and no outside options existed, the
German government derives the wrong transfer price because they split up the prots
after taxes without considering the fact that the transfer price has an impact on the
prot after taxes.
To illustrate this point assume that the bargaining power is divided equally among
both parties, so  = 1
2
. In such a situation, the true bargaining price between unrelated
10From the law text, it is not quite clear whether this rule is meant in the way we present it here
or whether the transfer price nally has to be divided by one minus the corporate tax rate of country
h. Both interpretations do not lead to a pricing rule that corresponds to a true bargaining price and
therefore can lead to distortions.
Transfer Pricing Rules and Business Relocations 23
parties would be (see Proposition 1)
PM =
1
2
(1   l) (p  cl) + 12 (1  h) (p  ch)
1  1
2
h   12 l
From this we conclude that if no empirical market price is available and consequently
that a hypothetical arms length test has to be performed, one should not rely on a
simple ad-hoc rule, but should instead try to come as close as possible to the arms-
length price. This involves taking into account the bargaining power and outside
options of the transferring and the receiving party. Moreover, proposition 3 shows that
if a relocation would not be carried out between independent companies but only due
to the lower transactions costs in form of a MNE, it su¢ ces to take the expected prot
of the transferring party as the transfer price to avoid ine¢ cient relocations.
As far as we understand the recent draft published by the OECD, the OECD favors
a case-by-case analysis of business relocations with special regard to the outside options
of the parties involved. This would be more in line with our insights.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the interaction of transfer pricing regulations and wel-
fare, identifying two types of ine¢ ciencies that may arise: rst, rms may choose a
rm structure for a relocation, which is not e¢ cient. Regulations that favor MNEs
compared to unrelated rms may lead to the formation of a MNE for tax reasons even
though it would be welfare-enhancing to carry out the transaction between unrelated
parties due to the di¤erences in transaction costs. Too-tight transfer pricing regulations
can prevent the formation of MNEs, although this kind of rm structure would be fa-
vorable with regard to transaction costs. Second, rms may not undertake a relocation
because under given transfer pricing regulations, it may not pay o¤ even though such
transactions would be welfare-enhancing. Again, the opposite is also possible here.
Regulations that are too loose can lead to transactions driven by tax saving incentives
rather than by real e¢ ciency gains.
We have shown that the simple and implementable rule that "related parties have
to use the market price of unrelated parties as the intercompany transfer price as long
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as no party is worse o¤" implements the rst-best solution. Surprisingly, this shows
that one does not have to account for the di¤erence in e¢ ciency between MNEs and
unrelated parties.
Furthermore, we analyzed the new German transfer pricing regulation by applying
our framework. Our analysis conrms that prices that are empirically observable im-
plement rst best and that no adjustment for di¤erences in e¢ ciency is necessary. We
conclude that in this sense the new German regulations are welfare-maximizing. How-
ever, if no empirical price is available, the German regulations require the hypothetical
arms length test. Our work shows that the average that has to be used as the transfer
price if the taxpayer cannot motivate an alternative price may induce the rm to take a
welfare-decreasing action. We therefore conclude that such simple rules should not be
used as a regulation mechanism. In particular, the consideration of the correct outside
options makes the application of a general formula very complicated and thus prone to
welfare-decreasing errors.
The policy implication drawn is that one cannot avoid extensive fact-gathering
on a case-by-case basis to nd a reasonable arms-length price. Given incomplete
and asymmetric information in reality, we acknowledge that this not an easy task.
Therefore, another study taking into account asymmetric or incomplete information
would be an interesting extension of our framework and leaves room for future work.
Chapter 2
Predatory Exclusive Dealing 
2.1 Introduction
The Chicago Schools critique of antitrust action against exclusive dealing is based on
the argument that (under the assumptions of those models) exclusive dealing is not
protable for rms in the absence of e¢ ciencies like the protection of prior investments
(see, for instance, Bork, 1978). From this it has concluded that exclusive dealing must
be benecial for welfare because it is only protable for rms if there is an e¢ ciency
rationale.11
The subsequent literature has shown, however, that exclusive dealing may be an-
ticompetitive if the implicit assumptions of the Chicago School are relaxed. Much of
this literature has focused on the exclusion of potential entrants. Exclusive dealing is
often protable in this case because potential entrants are assumed not to be in the
position of making countero¤ers at the time the exclusive contract is accepted (they
are not in the market yet). Under certain circumstances incumbents may therefore
exploit contracting externalities to prevent entry (see Aghion and Bolton, 1987, Ras-
mussen et al., 1991, Innes and Sexton, 1994, Segal and Whinston, 2000b, Fumagalli
and Motta, 2006, Simpson and Wickelgren, 2007, and Abito and Wright, 2008). The
identied circumstances under which exclusive dealing can anticompetitively exclude
rival incumbents are more restricted (see Mathewson and Winter, 1987, OBrien and
This chapter is joint work with Hans Zenger. Parts of this chapter were written during the
authors stay at the Chief Economist Team of DG Competition. The views expressed are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reect those of DG Competition or the European Commission.
11See Marvel, 1982, Segal and Whinston, 2000a, and De Meza and Selvaggi, 2009, for e¢ ciency
justications of exclusive dealing.
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Sha¤er, 1997, and, in particular, Bernheim and Whinston, 1998).12
What is common in all of the above models is that product market competition takes
place in a one-period game. The economic literature has therefore been concerned with
the question of under which circumstances exclusive dealing may increase the static
prots of a rm. Many, if not most, recent antitrust procedures against exclusive
dealing, however, have been concerned with another potential motivation to engage in
exclusive contracts: predatory exclusion of active rivals. Strong incumbent companies
are sometimes accused of accepting lower prots in one period to exclude an incumbent
competitor and recouping those losses in subsequent periods where monopoly rents can
be earned.
Indeed, U.S. antitrust enforcement currently seems to consider only this second
type of exclusive dealing as anticompetitive while typically not intervening against ex-
clusive dealing of the sort discussed in the literature (which raises, rather than reduces
current prots). One test that is considered in the U.S. is the prot-sacrice or no-
economic-sense test (see Salop, 2006). This test checks whether an exclusive contract
was consistent with (static) prot maximization. If it is found that prots were sacri-
ced (and hence exclusive dealing made no economic sense from a static perspective),
exclusive dealing is prohibited because it must have been predatory. If no prots were
sacriced, exclusive dealing is allowed, in line with the Chicago School argument.
To our knowledge, predatory exclusive dealing has so far not been analyzed for-
mally in the economic literature. This study tries to ll this gap by investigating the
ability of rms to use exclusive dealing in order to predate. Our model of predation
loosely follows Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), who rst formalized the long-purse story
of predation, according to which agency problems in nancial contracting may allow
predatory pricing to exclude rivals.13 By allowing for exclusivity clauses in a model
of predation, we show that exclusive dealing may arise in equilibrium even in circum-
stances where it can not be protable for a one-period prot maximization strategy.
12Spector (2007) provides a synthesis of the di¤erent strands of the literature.
13In some sense, our paper takes the opposite perspective of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). While
their paper is detailed in its modeling of the nancial market, it is crude in the way it treats the product
market. In particular, the price formation on the product market is not derived endogenously from a
model of competition. Our paper, on the other hand, is detailed in the modeling of the product market
while being crude in the treatment of the nancial market. In particular, the nancing constraints
from the nancial market are not derived endogenously from a model of asymmetric information, but
are assumed to be exogenous.
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Predatory exclusive dealing may not only be a possible strategy for dominant incum-
bents to exclude rivals; indeed, it is often a cheaper way of predating than predatory
pricing. As shown below, this is the case if the preys access to capital is not too
limited, making ordinary price predation expensive. It also turns out that the more
market power the predator has with respect to the prey, the more likely it is that
exclusive dealing is preferable for the predator compared to predatory pricing.
Besides predatory pricing, other strategies of exclusion in a dynamic setup have
been considered in the literature, under which rms trade o¤ lower current prots for
larger future prots. Carlton and Waldman (2002) describe how bundling can be used
in a predatory way in evolving network industries. Ordover and Sha¤er (2007) show
that rebate schemes can be used to exclude rival incumbents.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the model. Section 2.3
characterizes the equilibria of our two-period game. We solve the game by backward
induction. First, we analyze the second period subgames and then we turn to the rst
period. Section 2.4 extends the model to a situation where rms can o¤er non-linear
pricing schemes and Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The model combines the intuitions of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Bernheim and
Whinston (1998). Bolton and Scharfstein analyze a dynamic game of price competition
in which exit may occur, but do not allow for exclusive dealing clauses. Bernheim and
Whinston (1998), on the other hand, allow for exclusivity provisions, but consider only
a static pricing game.
In our model, there are two upstream rms 1 and 2, each with xed costs F and
marginal cost c, who compete in two periods  = 1; 2. In each period, rms rst
simultaneously announce whether they insist on exclusivity or not, as in Mathewson
and Winter (1987). Then they simultaneously set prices p1 and p2.14
14In order to allow for the possibility of exclusion, we assume that rms can not o¤er long term
contracts but set prices in each period, as is common in models of predation. Note that rmspricing
strategies are restricted to linear schemes in this section. In Section 4, we extend the analysis to
non-linear pricing (two-part tari¤s).
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The products are purchased by a large number of identical downstream buyers who
have preferences over the two goods according to the standard Hotelling model. Each
purchaser wants to buy a xed number of units in each period, which is normalized
to 1. Each (marginal) unit x 2 [0; 1] gives purchasers utility u1   tx if bought from
rm 1 and utility u2   t(1   x) if bought from rm 2, where t as usual denotes the
degree of product di¤erentiation between goods 1 and 2. As u1 and u2 may di¤er, we
allow for vertical product di¤erentiation in addition to the horizontal di¤erentiation
already inherent in the Hotelling model. Without loss of generality, let u1  u2 and
denote u := u1   u2  0 as the degree of dominance of rm 1.15 ;16 As usual in the
Hotelling model, we will assume that u1 and u2 are large and that both rms have the
capacity to serve the whole market. As a result, there will be full market coverage in
equilibrium. Moreover, let u < t, which implies that it is socially e¢ cient that at
least some units of rm 2 are sold (if it is active).
The timing of the dynamic game is as follows. The game starts when both rms
have sunk their xed costs in period 1. The rms then play the stage game described
above, consumers make their orders and rst period prots are realized. If the rms
expect non-negative prots in period 2 and have su¢ cient funds to nance their ongoing
operation, they remain in the market, and the stage game is repeated in the second
period. If one rm exits the market after period 1 (a possibility that will be specied
further below), this rm will not have to incur xed costs for period 2, and the other
rm will be able to charge monopoly prices. Second period prots are discounted by
some common discount factor , which we normalize to one. Where appropriate, we
interpret the results to account for the possibility of lower discount factors.17
In line with Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), let one rm be the predator with su¢ -
cient access to capital and the other rm be the prey, which is nancially constrained.
Due to the assumption that u1  u2, rm 1 is the stronger rm in terms of market
share in a standard one-period Hotelling game. It therefore makes sense to let rm
1 (the "dominant" rm) be the predator and rm 2 the prey. We will assume that
rm 2 does not obtain continued nancing by its investors if its prot 2 falls below
15The legal denition of dominance has typically been interpreted by economists as being equivalent
to a high degree of market power or a low elasticity of demand. In our model u is indeed positively
related to rm 1s prots and negatively related to its elasticity of demand.
16It would also be possible to introduce di¤erentiated marginal cost parameters. However, this
a¤ects possible equilibria in the same way as di¤erentiated utility parameters. In order to save on
notation, we therefore omit this type of di¤erentiation. The results can be easily reinterpreted to
account for cost di¤erentials.
17Doing so also allows reinterpreting the results for an innitely repeated game, with  > 1 repre-
senting the fact that there is a stream of future prots deriving from periods 2; :::;1.
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some threshold 2 in the rst period stage game. For instance, this constraint could
represent Bolton and Scharfsteins (1990) argument that the weaker rms nanciers
face a problem of asymmetric information. If rst period prots turn out to be low,
this may either reect the fact that rm 2 is falling prey to a predator, or that rm 2 is
less e¢ cient than rm 1 and therefore can not survive in the marketplace. As investors
can not distinguish the origin of the losses, they decide to withdraw their funding if
prots are below 2.
Firm 2 can always guarantee a prot of  F by not producing anything in period 1.
A possibility for predation can therefore only arise if 2   F , which we will assume
to be the case. In the other direction, it seems reasonable that the rm will not be
shut down if it makes prots. We therefore have 2 2 [ F; 0], which we parameterize
with
2 =  F , (2.1)
where the parameter  2 [0; 1] represents the leniency of rm 2s banks. A value of
 = 0 means the banks are quite tough. Even if rm 2 breaks even, banks will shut it
down. A value of  = 1 on the other hand, means the banks are very soft. Only if rm
2 makes no sales at all it will be shut down; more moderate losses will be tolerated.
We are now ready to solve the game by backward induction starting in period 2.
We show that exclusion can also occur in a one-stage game, as analyzed in the previous
literature.
2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Second Period
There are two possible subgames that start in period 2. Either both rms are still
active or rm 2 has been cut o¤ from its funding after period 1 due to insu¢ cient
prots. If only rm 1 is active, it is easy to see that it charges the monopoly price
pM1 = u1   t, leading to demand xM = 1, prot M1 = u1   t   c   F and purchasers
rent UM = 1
2
t. Whether the rm announces exclusivity or not is irrelevant: there is no
competition anyway.
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Next consider the case where both rms are still active in period 2. If nobody has
announced an exclusivity requirement, rms play the standard Hotelling game, which
we denote as regular pricing for later reference. Given p1 and p2; each buyer purchases
x =
1
2
+
p2   p1 +u
2t
(2.2)
units of good 1 and 1  x units of good 2. The best response functions of rms 1 and
2 are therefore
p1(p2) =
1
2
(c+ t+ p2 +u) and p2(p1) =
1
2
(c+ t+ p1  u). (2.3)
This leads to a Nash equilibrium with
p1 = c+ t+
u
3
and p2 = c+ t 
u
3
,
so that
x =
1
2
+
u
6t
;
1 =
1
2t

t+
u
3
2
  F;
2 =
1
2t

t  u
3
2
  F;
and the purchasersrent is
U =
1
2
(u1 + u2)  c  5
4
t+
(u)2
36t
:
For later reference, note that rm 2s one-period prots are non-negative if and only if
F  1
2t

t  u
3
2
. (2.4)
If one of the rms has announced an exclusivity requirement, downstream pur-
chasers have to decide whether to exclusively buy from rm 1 or from rm 2. Sourcing
from rm 1 generates a higher utility for purchasers if and only if
p1  p2 +u.
The only undominated Nash equilibrium in this subgame involves consumers choos-
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ing the dominant rm (xED = 1) and rms choosing prices
pED1 = c+u and p
ED
2 = c.
The proof for this equilibrium is analogous to the standard Bertrand game with
di¤erentiated cost, where u corresponds to the cost di¤erential. There is cut-throat
competition, except for the cost advantage (here: utility advantage) of one of the rms.
Therefore, it is costly to bribe purchasers into exclusivity.18 The resulting equilibrium
prots are ED1 = u F and ED2 =  F , and the purchasersrent is UED = u2 c  12t.
As ED2 < 

2 for all parameter values, it is a dominant strategy for rm 2 not
to require exclusivity. Since rm 1 is the stronger competitor, rm 2 can only lose
any ght for exclusivity. For rm 1, however, exclusive dealing may or may not be
protable. Comparing ED1 and 

1; one nds that exclusive dealing is not protable
for rm 1 if and only if
u  3

2 
p
3

t. (2.5)
Since 3
 
2 p3 t 2 (0; t) ; this is a reiteration of Mathewson and Winters (1987)
result that exclusive dealing may occur in static games. In our model, exclusion in a
one-period subgame arises if horizontal product di¤erentiation is small (t is small) but
vertical product di¤erentiation is large (u is large).19 For our purposes, this is just a
reference point for later comparison. We will therefore now turn to the analysis of the
rst period to characterize the scope of predatory exclusive dealing.
2.3.2 First Period
The previous section has shown that there are two circumstances under which exit of
rm 2 can occur even if rm 1 strictly maximizes one-period prots without sacricing
current rents to induce exit of rm 2. First, if condition (2.5) does not hold, rm 1
would opt for exclusivity even if rm 2 were to stay in the market. As a consequence,
rm 2s prots fall below  F; and it must close down. Second, if condition (2.4) does
18As in the Bertrand game with di¤erentiated cost, there exist additional Nash equilibria, which,
however, involve the play of weakly dominated strategies by rm 2. Here, and in what follows, we will
focus on undominated equilibria.
19A cost advantage of rm 1 vis-à-vis rm 2 has an e¤ect equivalent to vertical product di¤erenti-
ation.
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not hold, the competition under regular pricing is so intense that rm 2 can not cover
its xed costs of operation. In that case, rm 2 will voluntarily exit after period 1.
Staying put would only inict additional losses in period 2.
These two outcomes can be described as predation by e¤ect because the implied
strategies by rm 1 do not have the object of cutting rm 2 o¤ from its funding. This
is only the unintended e¤ect of a strategy that maximizes one-period prots.20 The
analysis of the overall game for these two cases is trivial. In period 1, both rms play
the strategy that is optimal in a static game; rm 2 exits and rm 1 earns monopoly
rents in period 2. Hence, we will now turn to the more interesting situation where
conditions (2.4) and (2.5) hold, in which case exclusion is not protable absent the
intent to remove a competitor from the market. If exclusion occurs in this setting,
then it is predation by object ; that is, the willful sacrice of current prots to earn
future monopoly rents.21
If future monopoly prots are su¢ ciently high, some form of predation might be
desirable for rm 1. In order to decrease rm 2s prots below the cuto¤ threshold
 F , rm 1 may either propose an exclusive contract (predatory exclusive dealing) or
decrease its retail price below the level that is optimal from the viewpoint of static
prot maximization (predatory pricing). The exclusive dealing strategy was outlined
in the previous section. We therefore turn to predatory pricing now.
Given p1, rm 2s optimal response p2(p1) is given by (2.3). Plugging this into rm
2s prot function yields
2(p1) =
(p1   c+ t u)2
8t
  F .
Setting this expression equal to  F and rearranging gives the largest p1 consistent
with exclusion of rm 2, which is
pP1 = c  t+u+
p
8t(1  )F .
20Notice that exclusive dealing may nevertheless cause damage to consumers. Even if consumers
benet in period 1 because rm 1 has to bribe them into exclusivity by o¤ering favorable conditions,
they will incur substantial future losses by facing a monopolist in period 2.
21In practice, the goal of predation may not always be the virtual exit of the competitor. The
predator may alternatively try to marginalize the prey by pushing it into a niche segment of the
market or by making sure that the prey does not obtain the nancial resources to compete in the
high-quality product spectrum.
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As a result, the optimal price of rm 2 is given by
pP2 = c+
p
2t(1  )F .
This leads to
xP = 1 
r
(1  )F
2t
;
P1 =
 
1 
r
(1  )F
2t
!
u  t+
p
8t(1  )F

  F;
P2 =  F;
and
UP =
1
2
t:
To determine the rst period outcome, rm 1 compares the three possible strategies
at its disposal: predatory pricing (leading to prots of P1 + 
M
1 ), predatory exclusive
dealing (leading to prots of ED1 + 
M
1 ) and regular pricing (leading to prots of
21). The following proposition shows that all three outcomes are possible equilibria
depending on the parameter values.22 So indeed it may be optimal for rm 1 to use an
exclusive dealing contract to predate. However, it may also be the case that predatory
pricing is a more protable strategy for rm 1 or that neither of the two predatory
strategies is protable.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose that rms 1 and 2 compete in a dynamic pricing game.
Then predatory exclusion may occur in period 1 if monopoly prots in period 2 are
su¢ ciently large. Depending on the parameters, exclusion either takes the form of
predatory exclusive dealing or of predatory pricing. Exclusive dealing may occur even
in a situation where exclusivity provisions can not increase one-period prots.
Given that both predatory pricing and predatory exclusive dealing can arise in
equilibrium, the question is under which circumstances one or the other is preferable
for rm 1. Proposition 2 provides a rst answer.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that future monopoly prots are su¢ ciently large for some
form of predatory exclusion to arise in period 1. Then, predatory exclusive dealing is
22All proofs of this chapter are contained in the appendix.
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more likely to occur if the nancing constraint of the prey is soft ( is large), while
predatory pricing is more likely to occur if the nancing constraint of the prey is strict
( is small).
This result reects the main advantages and disadvantages of the two instruments.
The big disadvantage of predatory pricing is that it forces rm 1 to decrease prices not
only for marginal units (those that it intends to capture from rm 2 to force the latters
prots down), but also for intramarginal units. Predation is a costly exercise: the
predator wants to enhance his reach, but this forces him to decrease prices. Exclusive
dealing is less harmful in that respect. While it captures sales that would otherwise go
to rm 2, it is easier to obtain prots on intramarginal units: At the equilibrium price
under exclusive dealing, purchasers would prefer to source both from rm 1 and rm 2.
However, the exclusivity clause prohibits that. Because no purchaser can obtain any
units from rm 2, the choice is to purchase either all sales from rm 1 or none. Since
consumers do not want to forgo rm 1 consumption (especially if u is large), rm 1
can save some of the rents on intramarginal units.
However, exclusive dealing is not without cost relative to predatory pricing. The
big disadvantage of exclusive dealing is its scope. Exclusivity forces consumers to give
up all of the consumer surplus that they would enjoy from sourcing some units from
rm 2. This makes it costly to convince consumers to accept an exclusivity clause,
especially if rm 1s advantage u over rm 2 is only moderate. Predatory pricing
does not su¤er from this disadvantage. In fact, it can be tailored to the degree of market
exclusion that is necessary to induce exit of the prey. Indeed, if a small reduction of
prices is su¢ cient to push rm 2 into losses because the nancing constraints of rm 2
are tight, then bribing consumers into exclusivity would be far too expensive. Hence,
predatory pricing is more attractive if banks are tough, while exclusive dealing is more
attractive if banks are soft.
The following proposition relates the foregoing discussion to the degree of domi-
nance of the predator.
Proposition 2.3 Suppose that future monopoly prots are su¢ ciently large for some
form of predatory exclusion to arise in period 1. Then, predatory exclusive dealing is
more likely to occur if the degree of dominance u of the large rm is large, while
predatory pricing is more likely to occur if the the degree of dominance u of the large
rm is small.
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Note that Proposition 3 is in line with the legal provision observed in many ju-
risdictions that exclusive dealing can only be an o¤ense if practiced by a dominant
undertaking. For instance, Article 82 of the Treaty of the European Union, which
deals with exclusive contracts in European antitrust law, requires dominance as a pre-
condition for an investigation. In light of the previous discussion, the intuition behind
Proposition 3 is clear. If the predator is more dominant, then it would gain a large
market share even if it did not predate. Bribing purchasers into accepting exclusion is
less costly because the buyers do not regret losing access to rm 2s products as much
as would otherwise be the case. The cost of predatory pricing, on the other hand, is
relatively large in this scenario. Recall that its disadvantage is that prices are also
reduced for intramarginal units. Since a dominant rm has many of those, it is more
reluctant to use this instrument.
Finally, we will relate the question of when predatory exclusive dealing occurs
to a measure of rm 1s optimal predatory price. Proposition 4 shows that a sharp
distinction can be drawn to indicate under which circumstances exclusivity is protable.
Proposition 2.4 Suppose that future monopoly prots are su¢ ciently large for some
form of predation to arise in period 1. Then, predatory exclusive dealing will always be
chosen if predatory pricing would involve below-cost predation (pP1  c).
Proposition 4 shows that rm 1 always prefers predatory exclusive dealing if preda-
tory pricing is so costly that rm 1 has to lower its price below marginal costs to
predate (pP1  c).23 This is an interesting observation given the ongoing debate con-
cerning whether or not above-cost predation should be prosecuted by antitrust law
enforcement.24
The prospect of predatory exclusion substantially alters the policy implications
of exclusive dealing. For instance, Krattenmaker and Salop (1986) argue, based on
models of exclusion in a static setting, that exclusionary practices should be prohibited
only if they allow rms to raise prices. Matthewson and Winter (1987) support this
standard and argue that the famous prohibition decision in Standard Fashion does
23With di¤erentiated cost, below-cost predation can theoretically arise in our model. However,
only if the predator is less cost e¢ cient than the prey is this the case. If the predator has lower
marginal costs than the prey, then below-cost predation can also be ruled out for di¤erentiated cost
parameters.
24For a discussion of above-cost predation see Edlin (2002) and Elhauge (2003), who disagree on
the merits of such interventions.
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not pass the test because exclusivity led to signicant (short-term) price decreases
for purchasers who accepted exclusivity. However, as the following proposition shows,
predatory exclusive dealing always leads to price decreases as rm 1 has to convince
consumers to give up sourcing from rm 2. The proposed antitrust standard would
therefore imply per se legality of predatory exclusion, a recommendation that one may
question.
Proposition 2.5 If predatory exclusive dealing arises, then it leads to a price decrease
relative to regular pricing in the rst period, (pED1 < p

1), but to price increases there-
after, (pM1 > p

1).
We will nish this section with a short word on the welfare e¤ects of predatory
exclusive dealing. Maybe not surprisingly, these are ambiguous. Indeed, predatory
exclusive dealing causes a distortion in product variety (there is no consumption of
rm 2s products). It is important to note, however, that regular pricing also leads to
distorted product variety, even though there is no full exclusion: While under exclusive
dealing purchasers obtain too many of rm 1s products (1 instead of 1
2
+ u
2t
), they
obtain too few under regular pricing (1
2
+u
6t
instead of 1
2
+u
2t
) as rm 1 exerts its market
power by restricting quantity. Moreover, predation saves on future xed costs (along
the lines of Mankiw and Whinstons [1986] argument of excessive entry). Regarding
consumer surplus, there is an additional trade-o¤. While predatory exclusive dealing
leads to lower prices in period 1, it leads to higher prices in period 2. Overall, the
welfare conclusions are also ambiguous here.
2.4 Non-Linear Pricing
We will now analyze an extension of our basic model that allows for non-linear pricing
as in OBrien and Sha¤er (1997). Consider a game that is equivalent to our previous
set-up except that rms can now set two-part tari¤s. Therefore, each rm i chooses
prices (Li; pi), where Li denotes a lump-sum charge and pi denotes a per-unit charge.
As before, we will rst identify equilibria in the period 2 subgames. Suppose exclu-
sivity has not been announced by any rm. If buyers purchase from both rms,
x =
1
2
+
p2   p1 +u
2t
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as before. But now there are two incentive constraints that ensure that it is optimal
to purchase from both rm 1 and rm 2. The utility of purchasing from both must
be larger than purchasing from either rm alone. Comparing the respective consumer
surpluses for rm 1 (U(1; 2)  U(2)) yields
L1  1
t

p2   p1 +u+ t
2
2
. (2.6)
Similarly, we have
L2  1
t

p1   p2  u+ t
2
2
(2.7)
for rm 2. Both constraints must bind in equilibrium (otherwise, a rm could increase
its prots by raising the xed fee).
Therefore, rm 1 chooses p1 to maximize
1 =

1
2
+
p2   p1 +u
2t

(p1   c) + 1
t

p2   p1 +u+ t
2
2
  F
where L1 has been substituted from (2.6). This gives p1 = c. Likewise, p

2 = c. Hence,
x =
1
2
+
u
2t
;
L1 =
1
t

t+u
2
2
and L2 =
1
t

t u
2
2
which leads to
1 =
1
t

t+u
2
2
  F
and
2 =
1
t

t u
2
2
  F:
Note that 2  0 if and only if
u  t  2
p
tF (2.8)
which we will again assume to hold. Otherwise exit of rm 2 would automatically occur
after period 1.
Next we will investigate the subgame where one of the rms has announced an
exclusivity requirement. In this case, buyers will purchase the measure one units from
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either rm 1 or rm 2. As the volume is xed, the structure of the payment (xed or
variable) is irrelevant; only the total level matters. Hence, without loss of generality,
we can set pED1 = p
ED
2 = c.
Buyers will purchase from rm 1 if and only if
L1  L2 +u.
With the previous Bertrand argument, this leads to equilibrium fees of
LED1 = u and L
ED
2 = 0.
Firm 2 will always be excluded in this subgame, i.e. xED = 1. Therefore,
ED1 = u  F
and
ED2 =  F:
It is easy to see that ED2  2. Therefore, rm 2 will never announce exclusivity
in period 1. Exclusive dealing will be more protable for rm 1 (ED1 > 

1) if and only
if
(u  t)2 < 0,
which can not be the case. Hence, exclusive dealing will never be used, and regular
pricing is the relevant subgame in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the overall
game. This result contrasts with the result of Section 3: If rms can employ two-
part tari¤s exclusion can never be protable in a one-period game. This is in line
with OBrien and Sha¤er (1997) and Bernheim and Whinston (1998), who show that
Mathewson and Winters (1987) result is reversed if non-linear pricing schemes are
taken into account. Essentially, these results restore the logic of Bork (1978) that rms
can not increase their prots through exclusivity provisions.
But while exclusive dealing is not protable in a static environment, it may still be
the case that it is a useful instrument to predate on competitors. This would rationalize
the view held by some observers that exclusive dealing should only be questioned by
competition authorities if it can be shown to be predatory.
Assume period 2 prots are su¢ ciently large for some form of predatory exclusion
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to be optimal. Exclusive dealing is one possible strategy to predate. The equilibrium
of this subgame was described above. Next consider price predation. As p2 = c is
optimal for rm 2 irrespective of rm 1s choice of price schedule, its optimal xed fee
depending on p1 can be inferred from (7) as
L2 =
1
t

p1   c u+ t
2
2
.
This yields prots of
2 =
1
t

p1   c u+ t
2
2
  F .
In order to predate, these prots have to be pushed down to  F . This occurs if
pP1 = c+u  t+ 2
p
t(1  )F . (2.9)
Therefore
LP1 = t  2
p
t(1  )F + (1  )F ,
xP = 1 
r
(1  )F
t
;
and
P1 = u  F +
r
(1  )F
t
(t u)  (1  )F:
Comparing ED1 and 
P
1 then yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2.6 Suppose that rms 1 and 2 compete in a dynamic pricing game with
two-part tari¤s. Then, neither of the two rms will impose an exclusivity requirement
on purchasers.
In other words, there is a one-to-one relationship between the environment that
allows exclusion to be protable in a one-period setup and the environment that allows
exclusion to be protable in a dynamic setting. In the logic of Bernheim and Whinston
(1998), exclusive dealing can only be protable in the absence of e¢ ciency motives if
there are contracting externalities. As shown in Sections 3 and 4, one such imperfection
is the case where rms are restricted in setting non-linear tari¤s.25 While Proposition
25The argument readily extends to the case where rms can use two-part tari¤s, but can only
increase xed fees up to some limit L. It is easy to show that predatory exclusive dealing is protable
for rm 1 provided that L is not too large.
Predatory Exclusive Dealing 40
5 (and the previous results by OBrien and Sha¤er, 1997, and Bernheim and Whinston,
1998) calls for caution in marking exclusivity provisions as anticompetitive, there are
at least two important reasons why the situation depicted in the previous sections,
where predatory exclusive dealing could arise, might be more relevant in practice.
First, the assumption of two-part tari¤s with full knowledge of the demand curves
of individual purchasers is clearly extreme. Perfect price discrimination of the sort
assumed in this section, which allows full extraction on residual demand curves, is
typically not observed in the real world. However, once marginal cost pricing on in-
cremental units can not be maintained (say, because rms do not know purchasers
individual demands with certainty), we again enter a world with contracting externali-
ties. As Spector (2007) notes, nonlinear pricing together with asymmetric information
resembles linear pricing. We are therefore back in the scenario of Proposition 1; that
is, predatory exclusive dealing may occur.
Second, even if rms possess the large informational requirements leading to Propo-
sition 5, they may still prefer exclusive dealing over predatory pricing because it is less
easily detectable as a predatory strategy. This is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.7 Suppose that rms 1 and 2 compete in a dynamic pricing game with
two-part tari¤s. Then predatory pricing always involves below-cost predation (pP1 < c),
while predatory exclusive dealing can always be carried out with above-cost predation
(pED1  c).
As a result, competition authorities may be able to infer predatory pricing from
cost observations if rms use non-linear pricing schemes. Predatory exclusive dealing,
on the other hand, can always be carried out with incremental prices above cost. Thus,
it is likely to be more di¢ cult for a competition authority to actually prove that the
predator has sacriced prots by o¤ering exclusive contracts.
In summary, we believe that the result of Proposition 5 should be seen as pointing
to the necessary conditions for predatory exclusive dealing to arise, rather than ruling
it out as a matter of principle. In the limiting case of full information and perfect
non-linear pricing, predatory exclusive dealing will not arise. However, in a less than
perfect world, the intuition of the main body of this study again provides the relevant
framework of analysis.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced exclusivity clauses into a model of predation along the
lines of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). As a result, two distinct forms of predatory
exclusion arose in equilibrium, which are also observed in practice: predatory pricing
and predatory exclusive dealing. Exclusive dealing can be a protable strategy to ex-
clude rivals with nancing constraints, even in circumstances where exclusive contracts
can never be protable from the perspective of static prots. The more market power
a predator has on the product market, the more likely it is that predatory exclusive
dealing is a prot-maximizing strategy.
The previous literature on exclusive dealing has concluded that the exclusion of
existing competitors (as opposed to abstract potential entrants) can only have anti-
competitive e¤ects under particular conditions - for instance, if there are contracting
externalities from related markets (see Bernheim and Whinston, 1998, and Whinston,
2006). This study, in contrast, has argued that the scope for anticompetitive exclusive
dealing is much larger. While exclusive dealing may often not be protable in a static
context, it does provide a cheap and e¤ective instrument of predation.
Our model (and the related work by Mathewson and Winter, 1987, OBrien and
Sha¤er, 1997, and Bernheim and Whinston, 1998) has assumed that downstream pur-
chasers are either nal consumers or local monopolists, who do not compete with each
other. It would be interesting to extend the present analysis to downstream compe-
tition. Fumagalli and Motta (2006) and Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) have shown
that the e¤ect of downstream competition on the potential for exclusion is ambiguous
for the case of potential entrants. Extending this work to the exclusion of competing
incumbents seems to be a promising direction for future research.
Chapter 3
Targeted Advertising on Internet
Websites
3.1 Introduction
Recent technological advances enable internet websites to identify users27 and send
di¤erent individuals advertisements with di¤erent content. This practice is called tar-
geted advertising. Targeted advertising on internet websites raises new and interesting
questions for economist. When rms are able to learn the identity and characteristics
of users they are able to send individual users selective information on products. While
this could be potentially benecial to users if they get less undesired advertisements,
targeted advertising may also facilitate the practice of price discrimination. With this
study we contribute to the ongoing public debate among website providers, users and
privacy advocates on the desirability of a governmental ban on such new business
models.
Our analysis is motivated by the following observations: Among websites that cur-
rently attract the highest number of users and amount of internet tra¢ c are the so-
called "social networks". Social networks allow users to interact with each other online
and thus produce most of the content provided on the website themselves. In 2008,
more than 10% of online time was spent on websites such as Myspace, Facebook,28
StudiVZ, LinkedIn, Xing, etc.29 However, in contrast to already high and increasing
27In the following, we use the terms consumer and user synonymously.
28In 2008, myspace.com ranked third and facebook.com sixth among websites with the highest
market shares in the U.S., according to the web analyst Hitwise.
29For users that log into the internet through mobile devices the share was even above 40% in 2008.
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numbers of users and amount of time spent on these sites, the share of the global online
advertisement budget remains below 1%.
In order to make those websites more attractive for advertisers and thus to gener-
ate more prots, many sites are storing their userspersonal characteristics and usage
history of the site. The idea behind this practice is that companies hope to be able to
use this information to send tailored, personalized advertisements to users. In 2007,
Facebook started a cooperative with 60 companies to develop targeted advertising
(Facebook Social Ads).30 MySpace recently started a similar program (Hyper Target-
ing). Whether these programs will lead to higher revenues from advertising is hardly
predictable today, but the fact that the software producer Microsoft announced that it
purchased a 1.6% share of Facebook for $246 million on October 24, 2007, shows that
the market believes in the future revenue potential of these online communities.
In the U.S. and in the EU this brought up a vigorous discussion about consumer
privacy protection.31 Some privacy advocates even demand the prohibition of such
targeting practices. In some cases, users simply refrained from continuing to log on
to these websites after they learned about new information gathering policies. For
instance, when the German market leader for social networks, StudiVZ, forced users to
accept new General Terms and Conditions in January 2008, which explicitly allowed
the website to store and exploit information about users for advertising purposes, many
users deleted their proles. In February 2009, Facebook had to revert to its old policy
on user information under re from tens of thousands of protesting users. The new
Terms of Use had enabled the website to store personal information on users even after
they have closed their account.
The website providers argue that targeted advertising is good for consumers be-
cause consumers get fewer ads that do not interest them. In contrast, consumers and
privacy advocates argue that the storage and use of information can be exploited to
the users disadvantage. Aside from the illegal use of personal information, targeted
advertisements with targeted price o¤ers seem to be the main real issue of concern. As
Varian (1996) pointed out in his seminal paper on the economics of privacy: "When
rms learn about consumerspreferences, they can also o¤er them products that bet-
ter meet their needs and thereby lower their search costs. However, the disclosure of
30The rst link that appears after entering the term "targeted advertising" on the internet search
engine google.com leads to Facebook Social Ads.
31In 2007, the European Commission set up the Article 29 Working Party headed by the Federal
Commissioner on Data Protection. One of the central issues to be investigated by the group is targeted
advertising.
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information on consumer preferences involves a trade-o¤ between a reduction of search
costs and extraction of consumer surplus."
The simple fact that the internet enables consumers to easily compare prices does
not necessarily mean that prices have to be lower than before. Moreover, prices for
perfectly homogeneous products that can be bought online often di¤er signicantly.
Baye andMorgan (2001) present a theoretical model concerning websites through which
consumers can compare prices, e.g., shopper.com, and show that price dispersion can
be an equilibrium strategy for rms that advertise prices for homogenous products.
Another important question is whether price discrimination is a problem at all. In
the case of online advertisements consumers can always avoid high priced o¤ers and
look for cheaper alternatives. However, there are many real world examples where rms
actually tried to extract extra rents from consumers. The most prominent example in
the literature is the case of amazon.com. In 2000, amazon.com conducted experiments
with targeted pricing strategies: DVD movies were sold to consumers at di¤erent prices
(up to a 40% di¤erence for the same product) based on their purchasing history. Some
consumers react to these strategies by actively taking e¤orts to avoid online traces, e.g.,
through payment via services like privatebuy.com which makes purchases anonymous.
In this chapter, we develop a three-stage model to analyze the strategic interaction
between a website provider, users and advertising rms.32 Advertising is purely infor-
mative in our model, i.e., people learn about the characteristics and prices of products.
In the rst period, the website provider has to choose between nancing the website
with traditional non-targeted or with targeted advertising. Given the chosen mode,
the website then sets a price per ad. In the second stage, users decide to enter the
website or not.33 In our model users di¤er in their valuations for the services that
the site provides while they have the same aversion towards watching advertisements.
Moreover, users di¤er in their preferences for consumer products. Finally, rms selling
consumer products have to decide on the amount of advertisement they demand and
the price that they promote in their ads.
While it turns out that targeted advertising always benets rms, consumers are
not better o¤ in this mode. Under targeted advertising, the amount of advertisement
32For the sake of brevity, the term "website" will be used henceforth.
33We do not analyze the consequences of the illegal abuse of information. Besides, consumers in
our setting are not naive. They agree to the use of their personal information when they register on
the website.
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can indeed be lower compared to conventional non-targeted advertising. Moreover,
users indeed do not receive any ads for products anymore that they would never want
to buy. However, this potentially positive e¤ect for consumers is overcompensated by
the reduction in consumer rent that is caused by rmspractice of price discrimination.
We extend our model to examine the e¤ect of targeted advertising when rms have to
send the same content to all users they address. Interestingly, in this case consumers
can also benet from targeted advertising because they do not loose rent from buying
products compared to the non-targeted advertising mode.
From our analysis we can derive some policy recommendations. On the one hand,
it is undoubtedly positive that targeting lowers wastage of redundant advertisement
and thus increases e¢ ciency. On the other hand, the ability to address certain user
groups with special contents decreases consumer utility. To conclude from this that
targeted advertising should per se be prohibited seems to go too far. However, a ban
on price discrimination could make sure that targeted advertising increases the welfare
for all agents involved.
Related Literature
This chapter is mainly related to two strands of the literature, namely the literature
on the economics of privacy and the literature on two-sided (media) markets.
Several papers from the small, but growing literature on two-sided markets have
considered the special competitive e¤ects in markets where advertisers exert a negative
externality on consumers who dislike watching advertisements.34 In these models, rms
are willing to pay for advertisements because they are informative and thus leads to
more sales (e.g., see Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong (2006b), Crampes et al.
(2005)).35 Consumers perceive advertisements merely as annoying distractions with no
further benet for them. However, advertising can increase social welfare, because it
leads to increased sales and thus to higher prots. Because most of these studies are
motivated by traditional media like television and newspapers, they do not account for
34The basic literature on two-sided markets describes the interaction between two groups that are
mediated by a platform. See, e.g., Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , Nocke et al. (2007), Rochet and
Tirole (2003).
35"Informative" means that people learn about products or characteristics through advertisements,
but whithout changing preferences (ads are not persuasive). In the literature, many other e¤ects of
advertisements on consumers are considered, most recently in the eld of behavorial economics. For
an overview on the economics of advertising, see Bagwell (2007).
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new technological developments in the context of internet-based media websites that
allow to identify users and address certain groups of users with di¤erent contents.
We contribute to the existing literature by allowing consumers to potentially benet
from successful deals. While in our model users also dislike watching advertisement,
they can receive some additional benet from nding an o¤er for products which they
like. Thus, we can endogenously derive user participation on the website which depends
on the utility that users expect to receive from entering the website.
The paper closest to our model is probably Gantman and Spiegel (2004). They
consider a single programmer who has to decide whether to distribute new software for
a fee as shareware or to distribute it for free in a bundle with advertisements. Adware
allows advertisers to send targeted information to specic consumers and thus may
improve their purchasing decisions. In their model, a ban on (targeted) advertising
always reduces welfare as it prevents users from receiving information about consumer
products in addition to the utility from using the website.
However, our analysis di¤ers from this study in several ways. First, Gantman and
Spiegel do not discuss the e¤ects of targeted advertising compared to non-targeted
advertising. In their setup, a more e¤ective way of targeting simply means that the
probability that users notice advertisements increases. Second, they take the price for
consumer products as exogenously given. In contrast to their analysis, we explicitly
model the potential benets of targeting, i.e., users do not have to consume advertise-
ments for products that they would never buy, but also the potential disadvantages
of targeted advertising for consumers that can be caused through price discrimina-
tion. Moreover, we endogenously derive the prices for consumer products. Maybe not
surprisingly, our results suggest a more careful handling of targeted advertising.
Most of the recent literature on the economics of privacy and price discrimination
is concerned with dynamic pricing techniques. This includes the strategic interaction
between consumers trying to hide information about their preferences and rms trying
to learn more about user preferences (e.g., see Taylor (2004), (2008), Acquisiti and
Varian (2005)).36 In our model, users who decide to enter the website cannot hide their
characteristics, because we assume that some exposure of information about oneself is
36For an overview on recent developments in the economcis of price discrimination see Armstrong
(2006a).
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necessary to enjoy the usage of the website.37 However, users can decide to refrain
from entering the site at all.
The literature on dynamic pricing strategies focuses on the assumption that there
is no role for informative advertising because the market is fully covered.38 Esteves
(2009) analyzes a setup where rms can recognize customers with di¤erent purchase
histories and send them targeted advertisements with di¤erent prices. She shows that
price discrimination is generally bad for consumer surplus and welfare, though good
for rms, which is in line with our ndings.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the model.
In Section 3.3, we solve for the equilibrium when there is a single website provider
who has to decide whether to use targeted advertisements or traditional non-targeted
advertisements to nance the website. Section 3.4 examines the welfare e¤ects of
the website providers choice and also discusses the policy implications of the model.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
In our model, there are three types of agents: an internet website, a continuum of
potential users, and three rms, A, B and C, that each sell a di¤erent consumer
product.39 The website provides free registration and free use of its services to potential
users. The website is nanced by online advertisements, for which it charges advertising
rms a fee. Before people register, the website has to decide whether it commits to not
use the information that users disclose during the registration process and information
that users provide while using services provided by the website. If the website does
not commit itself, it passes collected information to advertisers, who are then able to
target certain consumers.
37Of course, it is possible in real world situations to feed a website with fake individual information,
but then it is also more di¢ cult to contact friends, business partners, or potential employers, i.e., to
enjoy the services provided by the website.
38Fudenberg and Villa-Boas (2006) provide a comprehensive survey on behaviour based price dis-
crimination.
39We need to consider three consumer products to show that, without targeting, there will always
be some misguided advertisements that create e¢ ciency losses. This e¤ect would not necessarily occur
with only two goods.
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3.2.1 Timing of the Model
Our setup consists of three stages. In the rst stage, the website chooses whether to use
traditional non-targeted or targeted advertisements. Under the rst option, the website
sets a per-unit advertising fee that rms must pay in order to display banner ads on the
website. All ads are sent to all users, so each user gets the same content and number
of advertisements. Under the second option, the website exploits the information that
users provide about themselves in order to group users according to their preferences
regarding the consumer products. Thus, advertisers again pay a per-unit fee, but now
they know exactly which group of consumers will get their advertisement.40 In the
second stage, each consumer decides whether to join the website or not. In the third
stage, rms choose how many ad banners to display given the advertising mode and
the advertising fee. Finally, consumers observe ads and buy products, and all payo¤s
are realized. This timing of our model is in line with Gantman and Spiegel (2004).
3.2.2 Consumers
There is a continuum of potential users of the website with a total mass of one. Users are
interested in enjoying the services a website provides. However, people do not like to be
disturbed by advertisements while using the site. In the literature on media markets
it is assumed that advertisements are purely informative, but the surplus generated
goes entirely to the advertisers who fully extract any consumer surplus. Therefore,
advertising can increase overall welfare, but consumers never benet. In our model,
we include the possibility that consumers and advertisers share the rent of a successful
deal and therefore both benet from advertising.
Let kA (kA 2 [0; 1]) be the number of ads that rm A pays for (e.g., the number
of times that rm As ad banners are displayed or the percentage of the screen which
is covered by ads while using the site). We assume that the probability of noticing
an ad from rm A does not depend on the number of ads demanded by the other
two rms, B and C. Moreover, we assume that the probability that a user notices
40We are aware that screening technologies developed by platforms are still in their infancy and
currently are not able to perfectly group users, so there will always be some probability that ads miss
their targets. However, in order to keep the model simple, we assume that in the targeting mode, users
can be idented without any probability of error. Moreover, it is expected that with technological
progress, screening will become more precise.
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an advertisement for a product is a concave function that increases in the amount of
advertising, f (kA) =
p
kA. Thus, for kA = 0, the probability of observing rm As
advertisements is zero, while for kA = 1, the probability of noticing at least one of rm
As ads is one.
Users have a di¤erent willingness to pay for the three advertised goods. We assume
that if a user observes the advertisement of a product, she buys one unit of it given
that the promoted price does not exceed her willingness to pay. Budget considerations,
preferences, and outside search options are all included in these exogenous values.41
In our model, each user belongs to one of three symmetric groups of users that we
categorize according to their preferences regarding consumer products. We denote the
willingness to pay of a user from group A to pay for the consumer product of rm A by
AA:
42 Moreover, we denote the willingness to pay of a user from group A for the product
of rmB by AB. Finally, 
A
C denotes the willingness to pay of a group A user for product
C. We assume that AA > 
A
C and 
A
B = 0. This means that a consumer of group A
has a higher willingness to pay for her preferred product, A, compared to product C
and a willingness to pay of zero for the third product, B. To keep the analysis simple,
we consider a completely symmetric setup. So, we have that vh = AA = 
B
B = 
C
C and
vl = BA = 
C
B = 
A
C as well as 
A
B = 
B
C = 
C
B = 0. Moreover, we assume that exactly
one-third of the population belongs to group A users, one third to group B users and
one-third to group C users.
We assume that the utility from using the website is di¤erent for each potential
user. In our model, the parameter that denotes utility, q; is uniformly distributed
in the population with support [0; Q] : To keep the analysis simple, we set Q = 1
w.l.o.g. While advertising provides users with potentially useful information about
consumer products, it also annoys users, because it distracts attention from using the
site. We assume that the resulting disutility is directly related to the volume of overall
advertisement given by  (kA + kB + kC) : The variable  measures how sensitive users
are concerning the advertisement intensity. The expected utility of a user in group A
from joining the website is43
UA (q) = q    (kA + kB + kC) +
p
kA
 
vh   pAA

+
p
kC
 
vl   pAC

:
41This is consistent with the literature on informative advertising, see e.g. Esteves (2009).
42In the following, the subscript refers to the type of rm, while the superscript refers to the
consumer group.
43Because the setup is completely symmetric, the same holds for the users of groups B and C.
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The rst term is the positive utility that a consumer enjoys from using the services of the
website. The second term is the disutility from being disturbed by an advertisement.
The third and fourth terms represent the potential added surplus that a user gets when
she observes advertisement for a good with a price that does not exceed her willingness
to pay. We assume that users have rational expectations about the prices that rms
will announce as well as rational expectations about the amount of advertising that
they have to encounter while using the site.
3.2.3 Firms
The website o¤ers rms the opportunity to display ad banners on its site. We assume
that rms can reach the users who enter the site only via advertising on this website.
Thus, in case they do not advertise, they do not sell anything (at least not to these
consumers). Moreover, we normalize production costs to zero w.l.o.g. Therefore, trade
is always benecial. Advertisers have to decide on two things. First, they have to
choose the amount of advertising they want to display given the unit price r that the
website sets. Second, they have to decide which price to set for their product given that
a fraction  of all potential users enters the website. Their decision depends on the
advertising mode of the website. Advertisers do not compete directly for consumers
because they are monopolists for their consumer product. This is consistent with the
literature on media markets (see Anderson and Coate, 2005).
Firmsexpected prots depend on the advertising mode of the website. Let us rst
look at the case of targeted advertising (in the following, we will denote this with the
superscript t for targeting). If the website has committed itself to sharing information
on consumers, advertisers know exactly to which type of consumer they send their ads.
The expected prot for the advertiser depends on the prices promoted to each group of
consumers and the number of advertisements sent to each group. As long as rms are
allowed to choose di¤erent price o¤ers for di¤erent consumers, this leads to an expected
prot for rm A of:
tA =
p
kt;ApA   rtkt;A
 
3
+
p
kt;BpB   rtkt;B
 
3
:
The rst term is the expected prot from users of group A and the second term is the
expected prot from users of group B. Because users of group C do not have a positive
willingness to pay for product A, they are of no value for rm A. The probability
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that a user of group A notices an ad,
p
kt;A; times the advertised price, pA, is the
expected revenue, while rtkt;A denotes the cost of advertising for rm A. This includes
the number of demanded ads times the per-unit price for ads. The second term is the
expected prot from ads sent to group B users.
Now consider the case with standard non-targeted advertising (in the following,
denoted by the superscript s for standard). Because the advertiser does not know
whether somebody who observes an ad is of type A, B or C, advertisement cannot be
targeted, but only sent to all users: In this case, the expected prot of rm A depends
on the price it promotes and the advertising intensity. If the price is so high that only
users from group A buy (in the following denoted by superscript h), the expected prot
is:
s;hA =
p
ks;hps;h

3
  rsks;h;
where ps;h > vl is such that only users of group A buy the product when they notice
an ad. If the price for good A is below or equal to the willingness of a consumer from
group B to pay (in the following denoted by superscript l), advertising can lead to
potential purchases from two-thirds of the population. Therefore, the expected prot
is
s;lA =
p
ks;lps;l
2
3
  rsks;l:
Because group C users have no interest in product A, there will always be some ads
that are completely wasted in the non-targeting mode.
3.2.4 Website Provider
We assume that the development cost for the website is already sunk at the moment
when the operator launches the site. Moreover, we assume that the website does not
incur any costs from additional users. Thus, the only cost that can occur from the
websites point of view is potentially fewer users when the advertisement intensity
increases.
The website providers problem is to decide in which mode to organize advertisement
and to set a price for ad banners. Therefore, the website rst determines the optimal
per-unit advertising fee given the expected prot from the targeting and the non-
targeting modes. Then, the website decides to which mode to commit itself to. Under
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the targeting mode, the websites expected prot is
t
 
rt

= 3rt
 
kt;A
 
rt
   kt;A (rt) ; kt;B (rt)
3
+ kt;B
 
rt
   kt;A (rt) ; kt;B (rt)
3
!
:
We have three di¤erent rms to which the website sells ads. Each rm sends ads to the
group that favors its product and to the group that likes its product less but still has
a positive willingness to pay. The share of potential users that actually join the site
is a function of the advertising intensity and therefore also depends on the advertising
fee that the website sets.
Now let us consider the case where the website commits to not exploit information
about consumers to target them. The expected prot is
s (rs) = 3rs (k (rs)) (3k (rs)) :
Here, advertisements cannot be directed to a particular group of consumers; rather, all
advertisements from all three rms reach all consumers.
3.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of our three-stage model.
We start with the last stage of the game and then solve by backward induction.
3.3.1 Third Stage
When rms have the opportunity to decide on the amount and content of advertising,
they can nd themselves either in the targeting or in the non-targeting mode. At this
stage users have already decided whether to enter the website. Therefore, rms take
the consumer decision as given. Consequently, they demand the number of banner ads
that maximizes their expected prots facing the per-unit fee for ad banners that the
website set in the rst period. Firms rst determine the prot maximizing amount of
ads for every price that they could possibly set for their consumer product and then
they choose the prot maximizing price.
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Targeting
Let us rst consider the case where the website has chosen the targeting mode in the
rst stage of the game. Advertisers receive explicit information about the preferences
of users and can therefore identify the users of all three di¤erent groups. Thus, rm
A is able to target the users who have the highest willingness to pay for its consumer
product. If it is protable, rm A can also send some advertisements to the users of
group B who like its product less. Obviously, sending ads to the third group of users,
C, is never protable because they have a willingness to pay of zero for consumer
product A. Firm A faces the following maximization problem:
max
kt;A;kt;B
t =
p
kt;A
 
pt;A
  rtkt;A 1
3
+
p
kt;B
 
pt;B
  rtkt;B 1
3
:
One-third of the users who actually joined the website in stage 2 belong to group A;
and one third belong to group B. The following Lemma characterizes rmsoptimal
decisions.44
Lemma 3.1 In the targeting mode, rm A promotes the price pt;A = vh to all users of
group A for its consumer product, and A price of
 
pt;B = vl

to all users of group B.
Firm As demand for advertisements sent to users of group A given a per-unit price of
rt is
kt;A
 
rt

=
 
vh
2
4 (rt)2
:
Firm As demand for advertisements sent to users of group B is:
kt;B
 
rt

=
 
vl
2
4 (rt)2
:
The consumer price decision is trivial. When rm A knows for sure that only
users of group A receive its ads, it can not be protable to advertise any other price
than the one that corresponds to the usersfull willingness to pay for the consumer
product. The same holds for ads sent to users of group B. The quantity decision
depends on the price per unit that the website sets in stage 1, rt. The optimal number
of advertisements increases with the maximum price that the advertiser can charge for
its consumer product and decreases with the price of the ads. Due to the fact that the
44All proofs of this chapter are contained in the appendix.
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probability function is concave in the number of ads, it is always optimal for rm A to
demand at least a small number of ads to be send to the users of group B.
Non-Targeting
Let us now turn to the standard non-targeting mode of advertising. Here, rms do not
receive specic information about the type of users whom they face. They only know
how people who joined the website are distributed within the population. Therefore,
rms have to decide whether they wish to promote a low price for their consumer
product and thereby potentially reach a larger number of users who observe their
ads or whether to promote a high price and thus reach only users who have a high
willingness to pay for their consumer good. In the latter case, ads that are received
by people with a willingness to pay lower than the price of the good are just wasted.
Under the standard advertising mode where rms o¤er their products for a high price
to users, rms face the following maximization problem:
max
ks;h
s;h =
p
ks;h
 
ps;h
 
3
  rs;hks;h:
Firms have to pay to send ads to all users, but only a third of the users will in fact
buy when they notice the ad. Under the standard advertising mode where rms o¤er
a potential bargain to some users, the expected prot is:
max
ks;l
s;l =
p
ks;l
 
ps;l
 2
3
  rs;lks;l:
Here, all ads that are observed by a user of group A or group B lead to a purchase. For
a given advertisement price r; and a given number of users ; we can now determine
when one price dominates the other. A rms optimal consumer price decision and the
optimal demand given rs are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.2 For a given advertisement price per-unit, rs, rm A demands
ks;h (rs) =
 
vh
2
36 (rs)2
units of advertisement in case it decides to advertise the high price ph = vh and
ks;l (rs) =
 
vl
2
9 (rs)2
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if it decides to advertise the low price,
 
pl = vl

. In the non-targeting mode rm a
chooses to advertise the high price when vh >
p
2vl and the low price otherwise.
Now that we have determined a rms behavior under each mode and given a fee
for placing advertisements on the website, we turn to the behavior of potential users.
3.3.2 Second Stage
At this stage of the game, the website has already committed to a mode. Potential
users observe the mode of advertising of the website and form expectations about the
behavior of rms. Thus, each consumer calculates her expected prot from joining
the website and decides whether to join or not. Therefore, we have to distinguish
three cases: Non-targeting when consumers expect to get some extra positive utility
from a good bargain from buying a consumer good; non-targeting, when consumers
do not expect to get a good deal for any consumer good; and nally, targeting, when
consumers also do not expect any extra utility from buying goods.
Targeting
Let us look again at the rst mode, targeting. Since users anticipate that rms will
extract their full willingness to pay, they do not expect to get any additional benet
from joining the site except for the utility that they derive from the using the website
itself. Expected utility for a type A user is, therefore
U t

q; pt;AA = v
h; pt;AB = v
l

= q   

kt;AA + k
t;A
B

:
Consumers will join the website if and only if they expect to receive a positive
utility from joining. Therefore, we can determine the marginal consumer who just gets
expected utility of zero and is therefore indi¤erent about joining the website or not.
Since U t (q) is increasing in q, we get a unique value of q, denoted by bq; below which
the user will not join the website. From this we can derive the number of users who
join the website under each mode. For targeting, the threshold is
bqt pt;AA = vh; pt;AB = vl =  kt;AA + kt;AB  :
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Since q is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1], the fraction of users who
decide to enter the website, , equals
t

pt;AA = v
h; pt;AB = v
l

=

1  bqt	 = n1   kt;AA + kt;AB o :
Non-targeting
Let us now turn to the mode of standard advertising without targeting. Given that
consumers expect rms to promote only high prices, they do not expect to get any
additional benet. The di¤erence from the targeting mode is that consumers may
expect to see a di¤erent amount of attention-disrupting ads. Thus, the expected utility
of a type A user is:
U s;h

q; ps;AA = v
h; ps;AB = v
h

= q   

ks;hA + k
s;h
B + k
s;h
C

:
The marginal consumer has the following critical q
bqs;h ps;AA = vh; ps;AB = vh =  ks;hA + ks;hB + ks;hC  :
From this follows the share of potential users who actually join the website
s;h

ps;AA = v
h; ps;AB = v
h

=
n
1  

ks;hA + k
s;h
B + k
s;h
C
o
:
Finally, when consumers expect to receive o¤ers that are below their willingness to
pay, they expect to get some extra rent. This leads to the following utility for a user
of type A
U s;l

q; ps;AA = v
l; ps;AB = v
l

= q   

ks;lA + k
s;l
B + k
s;l
C

+ v

ks;lA
  
vh   vl :
Here, the threshold value for q is
bqs;l ps;AA = vl; ps;AB = vl =  ks;lA + ks;lB + ks;lC   v ks;lA   vh   vl :
Targeted Advertising on Internet Platforms 57
Thus, the share of potential users who actually join the website is
s;l

ps;AA = v
l; ps;AB = v
l

= 1  

ks;lA + k
s;l
B + k
s;l
C

+ v

ks;lA
  
vh   vl :
The fraction of website users, s;l, is increasing with the potential benets from
joining the website

v

ks;lA
  
vh   vl and decreasing with the intensity of advertising
that each user faces, 
P
k.
3.3.3 First Stage
In the rst stage of the game, the website needs to choose its advertising mode, either
targeting or standard non-targeting. To determine the optimal choice, we have to
compare the expected prots under each alternative. Thus, we need to calculate the
prot-maximizing per-unit fees for advertisement r for each possible mode. For the non-
targeting mode, the website has to form expectations about which kind of o¤ers the
rms will nally advertise. An increase in r has several e¤ects that the website has to
consider. First, the higher r is, the lower the rms demand for advertisement. Second,
less advertising makes the website more attractive for users, but it also reduces the
probability that users observe ads and buy consumer products. To start, we consider
the situation where the website decides to choose the targeting mode.
Targeting
Under targeting, the website is able to sell advertisements to rms targeted at a cer-
tain group of consumers. Because we have three symmetric groups of consumers, the
expected prot is:
max
rt
t
 
rt

=

1    kt;h  rt+ kt;l  rt	  kt;h  rt+ kt;l  rt rt
under the targeting mode. The rst order conditions yield the optimal per unit price
for ads. We can then solve for the equilibrium of this subgame that is described in
Lemma 3.3.
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Lemma 3.3 The targeting equilibrium is characterized by
rt =
vuut3 (vh)2 + (vl)2
4
;
kt;h =
 
vh
2
3

(vh)2 + (vl)2
 ; kt;l =  vl2
3

(vh)2 + (vl)2
 ;
 =
2
3
:
This leads to a prot of
t =
1
3
vuut(vh)2 + (vl)2
3
for the website,
t =
q
(vh)2 + (vl)2
2
p
3
for the rms, and a surplus of
CS =
2
9
for consumers.
Non-Targeting
Under non-targeting, the website can only sell ads to all users. Because the website
knows that consumers behave di¤erently according to the expected product prices, the
website has to take rmsadvertising decision into account when setting the optimal
fee. Let s;h denote the websites prot when it expects that rms will promote high
prices, and s;l when it expects that rms will promote low prices. When expecting
high prices, the website faces the following maximization problem:
max
rs;h
s;h
 
rs;h

= 3

1  3ks;h  rs;h	 ks;h  rs;h rs;h
and the following maximization problem when it expects low prices:
max
rs;l
s;l
 
rs;l

= 3

1  3ks;l  rs;l+ v  ks;l  vh   vl	 ks;lrs;l:
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To make sure that we have an interior solution to our model, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1:  >
p
3
 
vh   vl :
Assumption 1 implies that the disutility from watching advertisements is not too low
compared to the potential benet from nding a cheap consumer product. Without
this assumption, it would be possible that all consumers want to enter the website
regardless of the amount of advertising that they have to consume.
Again, we can derive the optimal fees from the prot functions. Lemma 3.4 describes
the subgame when a high price for consumer products is expected:
Lemma 3.4 Given that the website expects rms to promote high prices, the equilib-
rium is characterized by
rs;h =
vh
p

2
;
ks;h =
1
9
;
s;h =
2
3
:
This leads to a prot of
s;h =
vh
9
p

for the website, and
s;h =
vh
27
p

for the rms, and a surplus of
CS =
2
9
for consumers.
Lemma 3.5 describes the subgame when a low price is expected. In the following,
let g denote the di¤erence between the willingness to pay for the most and the less
preferred good: g = vh   vl:
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Lemma 3.5 Given that the website expects rms to promote low prices, the equilibrium
is characterized by:
rs;l = vl
p
9 + g2   g
3
;
ks;l =
1p
9 + g2   g
2 ;
s;l = 1  q
3 + (g)2   g
2 + gp
3 + g2   g
 :
This leads to a prot of
s;l =
0BBB@1  3q
9 + (g)2   g
2 + 1q
9 + (g)2   g
g
1CCCA vlq
9 + (g)2   g
for the website, and
s;l =
0BBB@1  3q
9 + (g)2   g
2 + 1q
9 + (g)2   g
g
1CCCA vl3p9 + g2   g
for the rms, and a surplus of
CS =
 
1  3p
9+(g)2 g
2 + gq
9+(vh vl)2 g

!2
2
for consumers.
One can see that the optimal per-unit fee for ads increases with the di¤erence
between vh and vl.
Mode Choice
We are now able to solve the rst stage of the game. The website has to decide which
mode to select. This involves a comparison of the expected payo¤s from each subgame.
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The websites prot consists of three components: rst, the per-unit price per ad;
second the number of ads per user; and third, the number of users. From Lemma 3.1
and 3.2, rmsdemand for ads for a given per-unit price is always higher under the
targeting mode for two reasons: for one, the probability that an ad reaches its target
is higher. For another, ads that are noticed by a rms special clientele lead to higher
prots per purchase. In contrast, consumers are more tolerant of advertising when
they expect to receive some benet from buying a product in case that they notice an
ad and buy a product. The higher the expected additional benet vh   vl compared
to the disutility from watching distracting advertisements (measured through ), the
more tolerant they are regarding the number of ads.
It turns out that the number of users under non-targeting with low prices is always
higher than the number of users under targeting. The same applies to the number
of ads that the website can sell. However, the price per ad is always higher under
targeting. Thus, the question is when the latter e¤ect dominates.
We know from Lemma 3.2 that vh  p2vl implies that rms promote a low price for
their consumer product under the non-targeting mode. Advertisers take this decision
regardless of what the website prefers. Consequently, the website has to compare s;l
and t. The following proposition describes the websites decision when rms are
expected to advertise low prices.
Proposition 3.1 If preferences for the consumer product are relatively homogenous 
vh  p2vl, two cases can be distinguished. i) If the disutility from advertisement cap-
tured through  is low compared to the di¤erence in the willingness to pay for di¤erent
products, vh  vl; there exist parameters such that the website prefers the non-targeting
mode. If the disutility  from consuming advertisement is relatively high compared to
vh   vl; the website will choose the targeting mode.
When  is high in comparison with vh   vl , the targeting mode is more prefer-
able. Intuitively, the potential benet from advertising is relatively low for consumers.
Therefore, from the websites point of view it is more important that rms are willing
to pay more for ads under targeting. In contrast, when  is high compared to vh   vl,
the additional e¤ect of an expected bargain from buying a consumer product is con-
siderably large. Consequently, as the share of users under non-targeting approaches 1,
at some point, prots under non-targeting fall below the prots under non-targeting.
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However, we know from Lemma 3.2 that when vh vl increases ceteris paribus rms
will advertise the high price when the threshold vh =
p
2vl is passed. The following
proposition describes the websites decision in that case.
Proposition 3.2 When user preferences for the consumer products are relatively het-
erogenous
 
vh >
p
2vl

, the website will always opt for the targeting mode.
Here, the website compares s;h and t. In both modes, consumers are not able
to get additional benets from advertising. All rents from successful purchases go to
the rms. However, rms demand more ads for the same per-unit fee under targeting,
because they do not have to waste ads on users who do not buy their product, even
when noticing an ad. In addition to serving the group of users who like their product
the most, rms can also send ads with rebates to the group of users with the lower
willingness to pay for their product. Therefore, targeting always leads to higher prots.
This means that non-targeting with high prices will never be observed in equilibrium,
because this subgame is strictly dominated by targeting.
Our assumptions lead to clear-cut results. They mainly depend on two assumptions
in our model. First, we assume that the ability to identify consumer groups means that
rms can perfectly determine the willingness to pay for users. Second, we assume that
consumers buy exactly one unit of a consumer product when they notice advertisement
for it. Relaxing these assumptions could lead to the result that consumers always get
some rent from a successful purchase, also in the targeted advertising mode. In this
case, the results from proposition 3.1 and 3.2 would be less concise. At the end of the
next section we discuss the e¤ects when consumers can receive some rent under the
targeting mode.
3.4 Welfare and Policy Discussion
3.4.1 Welfare Analysis
In the previous section, we determined in which cases the website decides to choose
targeting over non-targeting. In the next section, we discuss the welfare consequences
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of this decision. The following proposition describes the welfare consequences given
that non-targeting with high prices never occurs:
Proposition 3.3 When user preferences for the consumer product are relatively het-
erogeneous
 
vh >
p
2vl

, consumer surplus is the same under targeting and non-
targeting, but prots are higher under targeting. Thus, targeting leads to higher welfare.
From Proposition 3.2, the website and advertisers obtain higher expected prots
from targeted advertising. From Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5, consumer surplus is
exactly the same under non-targeting with high prices and targeting (therefore, welfare
is higher in the targeting mode). The reason is that consumer rent is fully skimmed
under both modes. Thus, the website sets the price for advertising such that users face
exactly the same total amount of advertising under both targeting and non-targeting.
The only di¤erence is that the package of advertisement which is send to a consumer of
group A does not contain any ads for product C under targeting. Since consumers never
enjoy advertisement in our setup, but are equally annoyed by any ad which distracts
them from using the website, targeting does not provide any benets for them.
This result may come as a surprise at rst glance. Intuitively, one would expect
that better targeting leads to less advertising because the monopolist can trade o¤ the
number of users against the number of ads. However, this result does not arise in our
model.
The reason is that without any additional benets through buying cheap products,
the number of users joining the website is linearly decreasing in the total amount of
advertisement. The number of users constitutes the rst part of the websites prot.
The second component is the number of ads sold to the advertisers. Therefore, one
element of the websites prot is linearly increasing in k and one part that is linearly
decreasing in k. The last component of the prot function is the per unit fee per ads.
The relationship between r and k is determined through the advertising technology, i.e.,
the probability function. Thus, the optimal amount of k sent to consumers depends on
 and the slope of the probability function. Although the total amount of ads does not
change, consumers get more ads from the rms whose products they actually buy in the
targeting mode. Consequently, the e¢ ciency gains from targeted advertising compared
to non-targeted advertising are merely shared by the website and advertising rms.
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Our results may not be robust to some generalizations. First, we assumed that the
setup is completely symmetric. If this were not the case, di¤erent consumer groups
would, we conjecture, face a di¤erent amount of advertising under each mode. As a
result, the number of users from di¤erent consumer groups joining the website could
vary under each mode. Second, we consider only a per-unit fee for advertisement. While
this is a realistic baseline assumption, other forms of contracts between a website and
advertisers could bring about further results. For example, alternative to a per-unit
fee, some websites charge a fee for successful clicks.
The comparison between the non-targeting mode with low prices and the targeting
mode is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.4 When user preferences for the consumer product are relatively ho-
mogenous
 
vh  p2vl, consumers always prefer the non-targeting to the targeting
mode. Prots can be higher or lower under targeted advertising compared to non-
targeted advertising.
The intuition is as follows. From Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5, consumer surplus is al-
ways higher under non-targeting with low prices compared to targeting. Although the
amount of advertising that users have to consume is lower under the targeting mode,
this potentially positive e¤ect is overcompensated by the loss in consumer rent from
successful purchases.
So far, our analysis suggests that, while targeting seems to be good news for rms,
consumers are, at best, indi¤erent. We do not quantify the e¤ects, i.e.; whether the
loss in consumer rent is compensated by an increase in prots. As it stands, the model
suggests that a government that places more weight on consumer surplus than on
producer rents should consider a ban on targeted advertising. In the following section,
we will discuss a policy measure that mitigates the rather negative picture of targeting.
3.4.2 A Ban on Price Discrimination
In some countries, e.g. in Germany, sending specic users personal price o¤ers condi-
tional on their purchasing history or other user characteristics is prohibited. Translated
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to our setting this would mean that price discrimination between users from di¤erent
groups is not allowed. Nevertheless, rms can still have the possibility to send targeted
information to certain user groups. However, the content of advertisement has to be
the same for all users.
Analogous to the non-targeting mode in the previous section, advertisers now have
to decide again whether they prefer to advertise a low price and thus reach more
consumers or whether to advertise a high price and thus earn more money from a
successful deal. In the latter case, the results for consumers carry over from the previous
setting. Since consumers do not benet from ads per se, they are again indi¤erent
between targeting and non-targeting. For rms, the additional constraint leads to lower
prots compared to the unconstrained equilibrium. Nevertheless they still benet from
a reduction in wasted advertisement in the targeting mode. Therefore, targeting is still
the preferred choice.
The more interesting case is the one where advertisers prefer to promote low prices
in their ads. The following Lemma describes the subgame in such a setting.
Lemma 3.6 If consumerspreferences for the consumer product are relatively homoge-
nous
 
vh  p2vl, rms prefer to advertise low prices under targeting with a ban on
price discrimination. The equilibrium is characterized by
rt;l =
vl
p
3 + g2 + g

2
;
kt;l =
1p
3 + g2 + g
2 ;
t;l = 1  p
3 + g2   g
2 + gp
3 + g2   g
 :
The website then earns
t;l =
0B@1  p
3 + g2   g
2 + gp
3 + g2   g

1CA vlp
3 + g2   g ;
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the rms earn
t;l =
0B@1  p
3 + g2   g
2 + gp
3 + g2   g

1CA vl
2
p
3 + g2 + g
 ;
and consumers receive
CS =
 
1  p
3+g2 g
2 + gp
3+g2 g

!2
2
:
The following proposition summarizes the e¤ects of a ban on price discrimination
with regard to welfare.
Proposition 3.5 When rms are allowed to send targeted advertisements, but are not
allowed to price discriminate, consumers are never worse o¤ under targeting compared
to non-targeting. Prots for the website and advertising rms are always higher under
targeting compared to non-targeting.
Intuitively, due to the fact that consumers do not loose rents from a successful deal
compared to non-targeting, they may now benet from targeting. Ceteris paribus, the
same number of advertisements lead to a higher utility for users. As a consequence,
more users want to join the website. The reason is that while the disutility remains
the same, the probability of noticing an ad for the preferred product increases for the
same amount of advertising.45
Here, the website can in fact trade o¤ the total sum of ads sent to users against
the number of users. Since consumers are more tolerant towards ads, it is optimal
for the website to increase the number of ads in the targeting mode compared to the
non-targeting mode. Nevertheless, there will still be more users on the website under
targeted advertising compared to non-targeted advertising.
Since all agents benet from targeting, we conclude that as long as rms are not
allowed to price discriminate, e.g. through sending certain consumer groups special
45At this point it becomes clear why we consider a setting with three consumer products. If
there were only two products, there would be no di¤erence between targeting with low prices and
non-targeting with low prices.
Targeted Advertising on Internet Platforms 67
o¤ers and rebates, targeted advertising is positive for society. The reason is that in this
case both users and advertisers benet from an increase in the e¢ ciency of advertising.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a model that allows us to study an internet website
providerschoice between nancing the website with targeted or non-targeted adver-
tising. Advertising in this setting is purely informative and allows to transmit relevant
information on the characteristics and prices of products to consumers. Our model
explicitly accounts for the strategic interaction between the website, rm that adver-
tise and consumers. We show that targeted advertising always benets rms, but
consumers are at best indi¤erent between targeted and non-targeted advertising.
Consumers do not benet from targeted advertising, because it allows rms to price
discriminate and thus reduce consumer rent. This e¤ect overcompensates the positive
e¤ect of a reduced number of distracting advertisements that users have to consume
while visiting the website. In an extension of our basic model, we examine the e¤ect of
targeted advertising when rms are forced to send the same content to all users who
receive their advertisements. Interestingly, in this case consumers can also benet from
targeted advertising, because they do not loose rent from buying products compared
to the non-targeted advertising mode.
From our analysis we can derive some interesting policy recommendations. On the
one hand, it is positive that targeting lowers wastage of redundant advertisements and
thus increases e¢ ciency. On the other hand, the ability to address di¤erent user groups
with di¤erent content can decrease consumer surplus. While prohibiting targeted ad-
vertising may go to far, a ban on price discrimination could guarantee that targeted
advertising increases the welfare for all agents involved.
Acquisiti and Varian (2005) consider the possibility that rms use the information
they receive on consumer preferences from early purchases to o¤er them products that
better match their tastes und thus increase consumersutility in subsequent periods.
It would be interesting to extend our analysis to a dynamic setting with repeated
interaction between a website, consumers, and advertising rms in future research.
Furthermore, to introduce website competition could be a natural extension, bringing
new insights to our analysis.
Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1.1:
First part of the proposition: Firm h is willing to transfer its business only when the
compensation price is higher than the prot for producing at home:
(1  h) (p  ch) < (1  h)PM :
Firm l is willing to receive the business whenever:
(1   l)
 
p  cl   PM

> 0:
From this follows:
p  ch < PM < p  cl;
cl < ch:
Second part of the proposition: We assume that unrelated parties share the after-tax
surplus for relocation, denoted by S
 
PM

, according to their bargaining power, : The
rm in country h thus receives an after tax surplus equal to:
sh = (p  ch) (1  h) + S
 
PM

; (1.1)
where (p  ch) (1  h) corresponds to the after-tax prot which rm h can realize as
outside option. The after-tax surplus which the rm in country l receives is:
sl = (1  )S
 
PM

: (1.2)
The total surplus S
 
PM

, which is subject to negotiations, is no longer a xed value,
but changes with the amount of surplus attributed to each party, because of the di¤erent
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tax rates. In the standard Nash-bargaining approach, the total surplus is invariant
to the split of the surplus. In our setting, the surplus is exchanged via paying a
compensation price. Denote by h the after-tax prot of the transferring rm in country
h after the transfer has taken place:
h = P
M (1  h) : (1.3)
Denote by l the expected after-tax surplus by the receiving rm:
l =
 
p  cl   PM

(1   l) : (1.4)
Given the premise that the negotiated surpluses correspond to the expected after-tax
prots, it follows that
h = sh;
and
l = sl:
Replacing h and l from (1.3) and (1.4) in the equations (1.1) and (1.2) leads to
(p  ch) (1  h) + S
 
PM

= PM (1  h) ; (1.5)
and
(1  )S  PM =  p  cl   PM (1   l) : (1.6)
Rearranging (1.6) leads to:
S
 
PM

=

(1  )
 
p  cl   PM

(1   l) :
Substituting S
 
PM

in (1.5) leads to the following equation:
(p  ch) (1  h) + 
(1  )
 
p  cl   PM

(1   l) = PM (1  h) :
Solving for PM :
PM =
 (1   l) (p  cl) + (1  ) (1  h) (p  ch)
1  (1  ) h    l :
Proof of Proposition 1.2:
First part of proposition: The sum of prots of MNE after relocation can be stated as
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follows
(1  h)
 
P TP   dh
  (1   l)(P TP ) + (1   l)(p  cl   dl): (1.7)
The sum of prots of unrelated parties after relocation can be stated as follows
(1  h)
 
PM
  (1   l)(PM) + (1   l)(p  cl): (1.8)
(1.7) > (1.8) if and only if
( l   h)P TP   (1   l)dl   (1  h)dh > ( l   h)PM :
Rearranging leads to
P TP <
(1   l)dl + (1  h)dh
( l   h) + P
M :
Second part of proposition: The sum of prots of MNE after relocation can be stated
as follows
(1  h)
 
P TP   dh
  (1   l)(P TP ) + (1   l)(p  cl   dl): (1.9)
The sum of prots of unrelated parties given no relocation can be stated as
(1  h)(p  ch): (1.10)
(1.9) > (1.10) if and only if
(1  h)(p  ch) < (1  h)
 
P TP   dh
  (1   l)P TP + (1   l)(p  cl   dl):
Rearranging leads to
P TP <
(1  h)(p  ch + dh)  (1   l)(p  cl   dl)
( l   h) :
Proof of Proposition 1.3:
Condition 1: The relocation inside a MNE shall take place only if ch > cl+dl+dh:From
this follows that if it is not possible to condition on dl and dh the transfer price has to
be at least higher than the expected prot in country h
P TP  p  ch:
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Condition 2: If dl + dh  0, the relocation has to take place as MNE rather than
between unrelated parties. From this follows
(1 h)
 
P TP   dh

+(1  l)(p (cl + dl) P TP )  (1 h)PM+(1  l)(p cl PM);8d < 0:
Rearranging leads to
P TP  PM + (1   l)dl + (1  h)dh
( l   h) : (1.11)
If dl + dh < 0, the transaction has to take place between unrelated parties. Thus,
(1 h)
 
P TP   dh

+(1  l)(p (cl + dl) P TP ) < (1 h)PM+(1  l)(p cl PM);8d < 0:
Rearranging leads to
P TP > PMP +
(1   l)dl + (1  h)dh
( l   h) :
If governments cannot condition on di; i = l; h, it follows from (1.11) and (1.12) that
P TP = PMP is the unique intersection of the two sets of prices. Therefore, the unique
pricing rule which fullls condition 1 and 2 and thus implements rst best irrespective
of the realization of di; i = l; h is
P TP = maxfp  ch;PMg:
If it were possible dl + dh  0, the following set of transfer prices implements rst best
P TP = PM + y
(1   l)dl + (1  h)dh
( l   h) ;
with y 2 [0; 1] : If dl + dh < 0;the following set of transfer prices implements rst best
P TP = PM   y (1   l)dl + (1  h)dh
( l   h) ;
with y 2 [0; 1]. However, since our simple pricing rule is part of both sets for y = 0; it
is not necessary to know dl and dh to make sure that condition 2 is fullled.
Appendix to Chapter 1 72
Extension to a monotonous decision on relocation
So far we considered the case that a company has to decide whether to relocate a
business or not. Now we generalize the setting so that a rm has to decide on what
percentage of a business to relocate. To keep the analysis simple we assume that the
prots of rm h and rm l after the relocation are a monotonic function of the amount
of relocation. We denote by z (z 2 [0; 1]) the percentage of relocation. Thus, z = 0
means that no relocation takes place, z = 1 means that one hundred percent of the
business is relocated. Other values stand for intermediate shares. Let l (z) denote
the after-tax prot of rm l and h (z) the after-tax prot of rm h. We assume
that @l(z)
@z
> 0 and @h(z)
@z
< 0. The transfer pricing rule, P TP , does not directly
depend on z. But, in line with our previous analysis we assume that the transfer
price is conditioned on the after tax prots that realize after a share of z is relocated 
P TP (z) = f (l (z) (1   l) ,h (z) (1  h))

: Thus, the MNEs maximization prob-
lem with regard to z is
max
z
(z) =
 
l (z)  P TP (z)

(1   l) +
 
h (z) + P
TP (z)

(1  h) :
Related rms maximize the joint after-tax surplus of both subsidiaries after a reloca-
tion. Depending on the properties of l (z) and h (z) (e.g., if functions are concave)
there will either be a corner solution, i.e. no relocation at all, or full relocation, or an
interior solution.
From the rst order conditions follows that the transfer price inuences the percentage
of business to relocate
@l (z)
@z
(1   l) + @h (z)
@z
(1  h)  @P
TP (z)
@z
(h    l) = 0:
Thus, the decision on the optimal quantity is always inuenced by the transfer pricing
regulation.
In the following, we will show some consequences that follow from this fact with a
simple, numerical example:
Let l (z) = 1   z. So, for z = 0, the prot in country h is 1 and for a relocation of
hundred percent it is zero. Let h (z) =
p
z: So, for z = 0, the prot in country l is
zero and for z = 1, it is 1. First, we consider the case where tax rates are the same in
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both countries (h =  l = ). The MNE faces the following maximization problem
max
z
(z) = (l (z) + h (z)) (1  ) =
 
1  z +pz (1  ) :
From this follows the optimal percentage of relocation is z = 1
4
. Now we consider the
case that countries have di¤erent tax rates, but no transfer price regulations. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the tax rate in country l is zero and positive in
country h. The maximization problem now is
max
z
(z) = l (z) + h (z) (1  h) = (1  z) (1  h) +
p
z:
This leads to a percentage of relocation of z = 1
4(1 h)2 . Maybe not surprisingly, z
increases in h: This means that the higher the tax rate in country h compared to
country l, the higher the distortion. Intuitively, since the rm maximizes after-tax
prots it is optimal to relocate more than the e¢ cient amount, because the reduction
in prots before taxes is compensated by avoiding taxes in the high tax country. Fi-
nally, we consider the inuence of a transfer price. The MNE now faces the following
maximization problem
max
z
(z) = l (z) +
 
h (z)  P TP (z)

(h) = (1  z) (1  h)  P TP (z) h +
p
z:
The percentage of relocation now depends on P TP (z) :
z =
1
4

1  h +

@PTP (z)
@z

h
2 :
Thus, a positive transfer price can reduce the distortion. We see that only in case that
@PTP (z)
@z
= 1, the rst best allocation can be achieved.
Finally, we will show that even the market price negotiated by unrelated rms does not
necessarily lead to a rst best allocation. We take the market price from Proposition
1 and assume that  = 1
2
. This means that rms share the after-tax surplus of a
relocation equally. For our example, this leads to a price of
PM =
1
2
(l (z)) +
1
2
(1  h) (1  h (z))
1  1
2
h
:
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The derivative of PM with regard to z can be higher or lower than 1
@PM
@z
=
1
2

1
2
p
z

+ 1
2
(1  h) (1)
1  1
2
h
:
Therefore, even the market price does not necessarily lead to a rst best allocation.
Intuitively, the condition to share the after-tax prots equally implies that the transfer
price is not the same for di¤erent values of z. Consequently, the decision on z is
inuenced. To determine the second best transfer pricing rule in such an extended
setting goes beyond the scope of this chapter. The results from this extensions leave
room for future research.
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Proof of Proposition 2.1:
Assume that u1   u2  3
 
2 p3 t, so that an exclusive contract is not protable in
the last period of the game. Predatory exclusion occurs if
1 + 

1  max

ED1 ; 
P
1
	
+ M1 :
From section 3 and 4, we know the values for all four prots which can occur in the
dynamic pricing game. Thus,
1
t

t  u
3
2
 u1 t c+max
(
u;
 
1 
r
(1  )F
2t
!
u  t+
p
8t (1  )F
)
:
(2.10)
Let us rst consider the case that P1 < 
ED
1 . Therefore, if predatory exclusion occurs,
it takes the form of predatory exclusive dealing. In this case, inequality (2.10) reduces
to
t+
(u)2
t9
  2u
3
 u1   t  c+u: (2.11)
We start the analysis for the case that both rms have the same market power. Thus,
for u = 0; inequality (2.11) reduces to
2t  c  u1: (2.12)
As long as (2.12) is fullled, predatory exclusive dealing is a protable strategy for the
predator. It is straightforward to see that exclusion in a one period setting (i.e., in the
last period of the game) can not occur in this case as
u = 0 < 3

2 
p
3

t:
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Now we analyze what happens if u increases ceteris paribus. A marginal positive
change of u increases the prot in case of predatory exclusion by 1 and the prot from
the standard pricing game without exclusion by 2u
t9
  2
3
. Thus, only when u > 15
2
t
prots from predatory exclusive dealing increase less in u compared to the case of
no exclusion. However, when u > 15
2
t, u is also higher than 3
 
2 p3 t so even
if predatory exclusive dealing is no longer more protable, exclusion will nevertheless
occur as exclusion by e¤ect in a one-period setting.
Now we consider the case when P1  ED1 . Thus, if predatory exclusion occurs, it will
be achieved by predatory pricing. For this to be a prot maximizing strategy for the
predator, the following inequality must be satised:
t+
(u)2
t9
  2u
3
 u1 t c+
 
1 
r
(1  )F
2t
!
u  t+
p
8t (1  )F

: (2.13)
We start again with u = 0; thus (2.13) reduces to
t  u1   t  c+
 
1 
r
(1  )F
2t
!
 t+
p
8t (1  )F

: (2.14)
We can see that as long as the future monopoly prot is high enough (here represented
by u1) predatory pricing is a protable strategy. Rearranging (2.14) leads to:
2t  c 
 
1 
r
(1  )F
2t
!
 t+
p
8t (1  )F

 u1: (2.15)
The rst term of (2.15) is the same as under predatory exclusive dealing. Therefore,
for predatory pricing to be the prot maximizing strategy in case that u = 0, the
product of the brackets has to be positive. This is the case if  t+p8t (1  )F > 0.
We know that rm 2s static prot is non-negative for u = 0 if and only if 2F  t.
Since  2 (0; 1), both conditions are fullled as long as   3
4
.
Now we consider what happens when u increases ceteris paribus. A marginal increase
in u increases prots from predatory pricing by

1 
q
(1 )F
2t

compared to 2u
t9
 
2
3
from the normal pricing game without predation. Thus, for small values of u
predatory pricing becomes ceteris paribus more likely to occur when u increases,
while at some point the increase in u will make predatory pricing less attractive
compared to no predation at all. Again, this is not possible in the parameter space
which we allow for, i.e., u  3  2 p3 t.
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Proof of Proposition 2.2:
In the proof of proposition 1 we compared the two-period prots from predatory pricing
and predatory exclusive dealing with the prots from the pricing game without preda-
tion. Now we compare the two predation strategies with each other. Since monopoly
prots in period 2 are the same after successful predation, we only need to compare
the prots in period 1. Exclusive dealing is preferred by the predator, if
u >
 
1 
r
(1  )F
2t
!
u  t+
p
8t (1  )F

: (2.16)
Again, we start comparing the two prots for u = 0. In this case, the prot in period
1 from exclusive dealing is zero. From (2.16), the prot from predation is higher, if 
1 
r
(1  )F
2t
!
 t+
p
8t (1  )F

 0:
This is the case when 1   t
8F
 . Thus, predatory pricing is more likely to occur if
the nancing constraint of the prey is soft ( is large).
Let us now consider what happens when u increases. The rst period prot from
exclusive dealing increases by 1 for a marginal increase in u. The rst period prot
from predatory pricing increases by

1 
q
(1 )F
2t

(which is below 1 per denition)
for a marginal increase in u: Therefore, the critical  from which on exclusive dealing
is preferred to predatory pricing decreases ceteris paribus in u.
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
The proof of Proposition 3 follows directly from the proof of proposition 2. The rst
period prot from exclusive dealing increases by 1 for a marginal increase inu, but the
prot from predatory pricing increases by less than 1. Thus, ceteris paribus exclusive
dealing becomes more likely to occur than predatory pricing.
Proof of Proposition 2.4:
We know from section 4 that
pP1 = c  t+u+
p
8t (1  )F ;
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and from section 3 that
pED1 = c+u:
We start again with u = 0: Since pED1 = c, predatory pricing leads to fewer losses in
period 1 only if pP1  c. Otherwise, exclusive dealing dominates. As u marginally in-
creases, both prices ceteris paribus increase by 1, but xED1 < x
ED
1 = 1. Therefore, with
a positive u, the optimal price under predatory pricing has to be even signicantly
higher than c to dominate exclusive dealing. From this follows proposition 2.4.
Proof of Proposition 2.5:
From Proposition 4, exclusive dealing implies that pP1  c and so
u  t 
p
t (1  )F . (2.17)
pED1 < p

1 on the other hand implies that
u <
3
2
t. (2.18)
As the right-hand side of (2.17) is smaller than the right-hand side of (2.18), the
proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.6:
Comparing 1ED and 
1
P and rearranging yields that exclusive dealing is more protable
if and only if
u > t 
p
t (1  )F . (2.19)
The right hand side of (2.19) is larger than the right hand side of (2.8), therefore
(2.19) can not hold. Hence, Predatory pricing must yield higher prots than predatory
exclusive dealing.
Proof of Proposition 2.7:
From (2.9), pED1 < c if and only if
u < t  2
p
t (1  )F . (2.20)
The right hand side of (2.20) is larger than the right hand side of (2.8), therefore (2.20)
always holds. Moreover, as pointed out in the main text, the incremental price pED1 = c
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is part of an equilibrium in the exclusive dealing subgame; that is, pED1 < c can always
be avoided.
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Proof of Lemma 3.1:
Lemma 3.1 follows directly from the rst order conditions
@t
@kt;A
=
vhp
kt
  rt;
@t
@kt;B
=
plp
kt;B
  rt:
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
The rst part of Lemma 3.2 follows directly from the rst order conditions
@s;h
@ks;h
=
vh
6
p
ks;h
  rs;
@s;l
@k
=
vl
3
p
ks;h
  rs:
The second part of Lemma 2 follows from the rst part. Given that rms know their
optimal demand for advertisement for each consumer price, they compare the expected
prots. Promoting the high price leads to higher prots ifs
(vh)2
36 (rs)2

3
vh   rs
 
vh
2
36 (rs)2
 >
s
(pl)2
9 (rs)2
vl
2
3
  rs
 
vl
2
9 (rs)2
:
The left hand side is the expected prot from promoting a high price and the right
hand side is the expected prot from promoting a low price. Solving for vh leads to
vh >
p
2vl:
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Proof of Lemma 3.3:
The website anticipates the reaction of the advertisers and thus the maximization
problem reduces to
max
rt
t
 
rt

=
(
1  
  
vh
2
4 (rt)2
+
 
vl
2
4 (rt)2
!)  
vh
2
4 (rt)2
+
 
vl
2
4 (rt)2
!
rt:
The optimal per unit price follows from the rst order conditions
@t (rt)
@rt
=   1
(rt)2
  3
 
vh
2
+
 
vl
2
4 (rt)4
:
Proof of Lemma 3.4:
Here again, the website anticipates the reaction of advertisers. Given advertisers are
expected to advertise a high price, the website faces the following maximization problem
max
rs;h
s;h
 
rs;h

= 3
(
1  3
 
vh
2
36 (rt)2
)  
vh
2
36 (rt)2
rt:
The optimal fee follows from the rst order conditions
@s;h
 
rs;h

@rs;h
=   1
(rt)2
  3
 
vh
2
12 (rt)4
:
Proof of Lemma 3.5:
Given advertisers are expected to advertise the low price, the websites maximization
problem is
s;l
 
rs;l

= 3
(
1  3
 
vl
2
9 (rs;l)2
+
 
vl

3 (rs;l)
 
vh   vl)  vh2
9 (rs;l)2
rs;l:
The optimal fee follows from the rst order conditions
@s;l
 
rs;l

@rs;l
=   1
(rs;l)2
+ 3
 
vl
2
3 (rs;l)4
  2
 
vl

3 (rs;l)3
 
vh   vl :
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Proof of Proposition 3.1:
From Lemma 3.3, we know that the expected prot under targeting is
t =
r
(vh)2 + (vl)2

p
3
:
From Lemma 3.4 follows the prot under the non-targeting mode for low prices
s;l =
0B@1  3p
9 + g2   g
2 + 1p
9 + g2   g
g
1CA vlp
9 + g2   g :
Now we can compare t and s;h. t is higher than s;h when:r
(vh)2 + (vl)2

p
3
>
0BBB@1  3q
9 + (g)2   g
2 + gq
9 + (g)2   g

1CCCA vlq
9 + (g)2   g
:
First, for vh = vl, we can see that the left hand side is always higher than the right
hand side: p
2vl
3
p
3
>
2vl
9
p

:
When vh increases, the prot under non-targeting ceteris paribus increases more than
under targeting. At some point, non-targeting leads to higher expected prots. The
highest possible g follows from assumption 1. The most favorable situation for non-
targeting is when  is close to 1, so: g = vh   vl = p3. In this case, non-targeting is
always preferred as once can see from comparing the prots:
vuut (vh)2 + (vl)2
3
1
3
<
vlp
12  p3 :
Rearranging leads to:  
vh
2
+
 
vl
2
< 9
 
vl
2
:
Since we are considering a parameter space where vh  p2vl, the right hand side is
always higher than the left hand side. Therefore, non-targeting is preferred.
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
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From Lemma 3.3 we know that the expected prot for the website in the targeting
mode is
t =
r
(vh)2 + (vl)2

3
p
3
:
From Lemma 3.4 follows that the expected prot under standard non-targeting with
high prices is
s;h =
vh
9
p

:
It is straightforward to see that t is always higher than s;h.
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
We know that t > s;h from the proof of Proposition 3.1. Moreover, we know from
Lemma 3.3 and 3.4 that t = s;h = 2
3
. Thus, consumer surplus is also the same:
CS = 2 = 2
9
under both modes.
Proof of Proposition 3.4:
We know that consumer rent is the same under both modes when vh  p2vl: The
question is whether targeting can ever lead to a higher consumer surplus compared
to non-targeting. We know from Proposition 3 that consumer surplus is 2
9
under
non-targeting with high prices and under targeting. We show in the following that
s;l > 2
3
= t for all g:
s;l = 1  3p
9 + g2   g
2 + gp
9 + g2   g
 > 2
3
:
Rearranging leads to
9 > 0:
This inequality is always fullled. Due to the characteristics of our setup, there is a
one-to-one relationship between the share of users and utility. Thus, a higher share of
users under non-targeting means that users are better o¤ than under non-targeting.
Proof of Lemma 3.6:
When rms are not allowed to send information with di¤erent contents, they have to
decide whether to concentrate on their clientele or whether to address a larger part of
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users. From Lemma 3.1, we know rms demand for advertisement given a per unit
price of rt:
kt;h =
 
vh
2
4rt
; kt;l =
 
vl
2
4rt
:
Given that rms know the optimal demand for advertisement for each consumer price,
they compare the expected prots. Promoting the high price leads to higher prots if

3
 s
(vh)2
4 (rt)2
vh   rt
 
vh
2
4 (rt)2
!
>
2
3

 s
(vl)2
4 (rt)2
vl   rt
 
vl
2
4 (rt)2
!
:
The left hand side is the expected prot from promoting a high price and the right
hand side is the expected prot from promoting a low price. Solving for vh leads to
vh >
p
2vl:
Given advertisers are expected to advertise the low price, the websites maximization
problem is
max
rt;l
t;l
 
rt;l

= 3
(
1  
 
vl
2
4 (rt;l)2
+
 
vl

2 (rt;l)
 
vh   vl)  vh2
4 (rt;l)2
rt;l:
The optimal fee follows from the rst order conditions
@t;l
 
rs;l

@rt;l
=   1
(rt;l)2
+ 
3
 
vl
2
4 (rt;l)4
 
 
vl

(rt;l)3
 
vh   vl :
Proof of Proposition 3.5:
No we compare the number of users under targeting with low prices and non-targeting
with low prices. t;l > s;l, if
1  q
3 + (g)2   g
2+ gq
3 + (g)2   g
 > 1  3p
9 + g2   g
2+ gp
9 + g2   g
 :
Rearranging leads to:
Appendix to Chapter 3 85
p
9 + g2  
q
9 + 3 (g)2 < g

1 
p
3

:
The left hand side is always negative and the right hand side always positive. Thus,
we can see that the number of users under targeting is always higher than the number
of users under non- targeting. Therefore, consumers are better o¤ under targeting.
Comparing the prots, it is straightforward to see from Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 that
t;l > s;l; and also that t;l > s;l:
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